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ABSTRACT 
Leading up to and following the end of the Cold War a new wave of 
democratisation commenced in Sub-Saharan Africa and around the world which, in both 
cases, has been characterized by “blocked transitions,” the “rise of competitive 
authoritarianism,” and the proliferation of hybrid regimes.  This thesis is primarily 
concerned with “democratic” outcomes within these hybrid regimes.  Excluding data 
from prior to the end of the Cold War in global investigations of democracy, this thesis 
utilizes a temporally truncated dataset to reanalyse dominant theories of democratisation 
both at the global and regional (Sub-Saharan Africa) level, finding that when 
contaminating effects are removed the strongest correlation with democratic outcomes 
lies in the strength of prominent opposition parties. 
 
Keywords: Democratization, Sub-Saharan Africa, Opposition Parties, Democratic 
Outcomes, Hybrid Regimes, Democracy, Authoritarianism. 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Certificate          ii 
Abstract          iii  
Chapter 1 – Introduction        1 
Chapter 2 - Theory         7 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review       18 
Chapter 4 – Research Design, Methodology and Case Selection   26 
Chapter 5 – Quantitative Results       37 
Chapter 6 – Case Presentation       63 
Chapter 7 – Case Analysis        102 
Chapter 8 – Conclusion        112 
 
References          115 
Appendix          122 
  
 
i 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 GDP Per Capita and Democracy in the World 1989-2010   38 
Table 2 GDP Per Capita and Democracy in the World 1989-2010,   39  
  Where GDP per Capita is $2 Per Day or Less 
Table 3 GDP Per Capita in Africa 1989-2010      40 
Table 4 GDP Per Capita and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010   40 
Table 5 GDP Per Capita and Democracy in Africa 1990    41 
Table 6 Democracy in Africa Over Time 1989-2010     42 
Table 7 GDP Per Capita in Africa at 10 Year Intervals     43 
Table 8 Natural Resource Rents and Democracy in Impoverished States in the 44 
  World 1989-2010 
Table 9 Natural Resource Rents and Democracy in Impoverished States in   45 
  Africa 1989-2010 
Table 10 Difference of Means T-Test, System and Democracy, World 1989-2010 46 
Table 11 System and Democracy in the World 1989-2010    46 
Table 12 Difference of Means T-Test, System and Democracy, Africa 1989-2010 47 
Table 13 System and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010    47 
Table 14 Difference of Means T-Test, System and Party Strength, World  48 
  1989-2010 
Table 15 System and Party Strength, World 1989-2010    49 
Table 16 Difference of Means T-Test, System and Party Strength, Africa   49 
  1989-2010 
Table 17 System and Party Strength, Africa 1989-2010    50 
Table 18 Difference of Means T-Test, Proportional Representation and   51 
ii 
 
  Democracy, World 1989-2010 
Table 19 Proportional Representation and Democracy in the World 1989-2010 51 
Table 20 Difference of Means T-Test, Proportional Representation and   52 
  Democracy, Africa 1989-2010 
Table 21 Proportional Representation and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010  52 
Table 22 Difference of Means T-Test, Electoral System and Party Strength,  53 
  World 1989-2010 
Table 23 Electoral System and Party Strength, World 1989-2010   53 
Table 24 Difference of Means T-Test, Electoral System and Party Strength,  54 
  Africa 1989-2010 
Table 25 Electoral System and Party Strength, Africa 1989-2010   54 
Table 26 Opposition Strength and Democracy in the World 1989-2010, in  55 
  Presidential Systems 
Table 27 Opposition Strength and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010, in  56 
  Presidential Systems 
Table 28 Opposition Strength and Democracy in the World 1989-2010, in  57 
  Presidential Systems where the Leading Opposition Party is able to 
  Monopolize at least 25% of Opposition Seats 
Table 29 Opposition Strength and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010, in  57 
  Presidential Systems where the Leading Opposition Party is able to 
  Monopolize at least 25% of Opposition Seats 
Table 30 Central Tendency Variation in Polity Scores Across Time Based On  60 
  Distance from “Year Zero” as First Year in which an Opposition Party 
  Monopolizes at least 25% of Opposition Seats in an African Presidential 
  Regime between 1989 and 2010 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 This thesis aims to investigate two relationships which represent gaps in the 
existing literature on democratization in the post-Cold War world, namely: the 
relationship between domestic opposition parties and democratic outcomes in hybrid 
regimes, i.e. in regimes which have already introduced certain aspects of democracy 
without meeting all the minimal requirements which constitute democratic regimes; and, 
secondly, how and why these domestic opposition parties do, and do not, generate the 
capacity to influence the course of democratization.  It is the aim of this thesis to 
investigate these questions primarily as a question of Sub-Saharan African politics and, in 
so doing, the first question will be addressed quantitatively utilizing two datasets, one 
global and the other regional, including only Sub-Saharan African states, while the 
second question will be addressed through comparative case studies of three African 
states: Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda.   
It is the position of this thesis that strong and democratic domestic opposition 
parties are an important causal variable in democratic outcomes when they are able to 
monopolize a significant portion of the opposition as a whole, and that they do or do not 
acquire the capacity to do so based on a number of domestic variables, such as, but not 
limited to, their ability to finance themselves, to co-opt pre-existing organizational 
structures, as well as a given regime’s ability to construct formal institutions that allow it 
to exert control over the domestic party system. 
From the beginning of “the Third Wave”1 of democracy, and both approaching as 
well as following the end of the Cold War, many scholars began to focus on the question 
of transitions to democracy as a distinct question within the democratization literature in 
                                                          
1 Huntington 1991 
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comparative politics and international relations.  Over time, although this is certainly not 
a new phenomenon,2 focus has shifted to the phenomenon of partial transitions: 
“democracies with adjectives,” “authoritarianisms with adjectives,” et cetera.  In the 
determination of what constitutes the causal variables on democratic outcomes, 
predominant hypotheses over time have focused on or across different conceptual levels 
of analysis to include structural factors, such as the socioeconomic system, or the 
international system; institutional factors, such as the design of the electoral system or 
government; and voluntarist factors, such as the agency of autocrats in government and 
that of key opposition leaders.  While this thesis primarily focuses on non-incumbent 
political parties and the party systems within which they operate, providing a slight shift 
in focus from the foci of some of the predominant theories over time, the established 
alternative theories in the literature, their gaps, and their relationship to the position of 
thesis, must nevertheless be addressed. 
The most predominant structural theories of democratization have focused on the 
important questions of the relationship between a given socioeconomic system and 
democratization, and the relationship between international and transnational ties and 
democratization.   
Socioeconomic theories of democratization have a long established position in the 
literature which, with a number of expected modifications over time given its age, posits 
that socially and economically “developed” societies tend toward democracy, whilst 
underdeveloped societies are either not democratic or typically fail to consolidate 
democracy.  There are a number of strengths and weaknesses to this position, but this 
thesis focuses specifically on one of its more heretofore reliable positions: that there is a 
                                                          
2 Diamond 2002, 23; Levitsky and Way 2002, 59; Ottaway 2003, 4 
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discrete correlation between wealth, as an indicator of socioeconomic development, and 
democracy as a form of governance.  Recent literature and events question the coherence 
of a theory which essentially posits that wealthy states are either democratic, or at least 
highly stable whatever their form of governance, and that poor states are either not 
democratic, or are not capable of consolidating democracy.  In the context of this thesis, 
the gap that must be explored is that many “poor” states have taken measurable steps 
toward democracy and have consistently progressed in that direction, or are even widely 
considered to be democracies, without the expected authoritarian regression. 
One of the more predominant theories regarding the relationship between the 
international system and democratic outcomes is that linkages formed between states and 
Western Europe or the United States over time may explain democratization, or the lack 
thereof, in a given state, particularly when qualified by the vulnerability of regimes to 
leverage.  The gap this thesis attempts to explore in regard to this theory is the low 
expectation it holds for democratic outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular where, 
nevertheless, some democracies do exist, and where many additional states are arguably 
on a path progressing toward that end. 
Institutional theories of democratic outcomes, such as the differential effect of 
presidential and parliamentary systems on democratic outcomes, and the relationship 
between voting systems and democracy, provide integral insight into the inner workings 
of different systems and practices of governance.  The overarching concern of this thesis 
with these institutional design theories is to test the relationship between institutional 
design and democratic outcomes, and to determine if there is a distinct relationship 
between institutional design and the capacity of domestic opposition parties to acquire 
 4 
strength and durability as organizations. 
Finally, the most predominant voluntarist theory of democratic outcomes over 
time has been the theory of “pacted” transitions.  Although the value of pacts as 
guarantors that a given transition will actually result in democracy has been importantly 
called into question by at least one of the scholars who has studied them in depth, the gap 
that this thesis attempts to explore is not the outcome of agreements reached by agents, 
but what is structurally implied by pact makers reaching the negotiation table.  It is the 
position of this thesis that the ability to bring a given negotiation to the table is a result of 
the structural capacity of the organizations of which individual oppositionists are a part, 
and that the value of opposition organizations, i.e. of political parties in the context of this 
thesis, should be explored as separate and distinct from the agency of individual 
organization leaders. 
The most important gap in the literature this thesis addresses is the relationship 
between democratic opposition parties, party systems and democratic outcomes.3  The 
logical coherence of this position is so evident it is nearly common sense, but the ability 
to empirically demonstrate it in global or otherwise large studies has proven elusive.  
Most, if not all, of the theories mentioned above, as well as those which are not addressed 
herein, have either attempted to incorporate opposition parties into their explanatory 
models, or have indicated where they are not addressed that they, in all probability, play 
an important role.  Nevertheless, many attempts to demonstrate the relationship between 
opposition parties and democratic outcomes have been inconclusive, and some scholars 
                                                          
3 Erdmann, Basedau and Mehler 2007, 10 where it is indicated that this still represents a significant gap in 
the comprehension of the literature. 
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have even suggested, as a result, that their role in democratization may be non-essential.4  
It is the position of this thesis that opposition parties play an essential role in the process 
of democratization, but that the difficulties encountered in demonstrating as much have 
been a result of the unspecified duration,5 highly complex, and multifarious nature of 
democratization, and the competing domestic and international interests which are 
brought to bear in the process of democratization.  By appealing to restricted temporal 
parameters, important distinctions between what influences authoritarian versus hybrid 
regimes, and new measurement and operationalization approaches suggested by recent 
research, this thesis attempts to explicate and make discrete the relationship between 
democratic opposition parties and democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes. 
The plan of this thesis is to commence by expounding the theoretical relationship 
between opposition parties and the process of democratization (Chapter 2), followed by a 
review of the broader literature (Chapter 3).  In Chapter 4 the design of the research and 
the methodological approach will be discussed in detail.  Chapter 5 will present the 
quantitative results concerning the relationship between democratic opposition parties 
and democratic outcomes, as well as highlight some of the changes which occur in the 
relationships between other explanatory models and democratic outcomes when they are 
exposed only to the temporally truncated dataset argued for herein.  It should be noted 
that the overarching purpose of exposing some of these alternative models to retesting 
within new parameters is not to cast disapprobation upon them, but to investigate the 
                                                          
4 See, for example: Diamond and Gunther 2001, x, that it would be too much to argue that institutionally 
strong political parties are a necessary condition for consolidating or maintaining democracy, and: Rakner 
and van de Walle 2009b, 109, wherein the authors suggest that opposition weakness is both a cause as well 
as a consequence of democratic deficits, and find only a weak correlation between opposition strength and 
democratic outcomes. 
5 See, for example: Schedler 2010, 69-70 
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position that, given the extremely complex nature of democratization, those variables 
which can be expected to hold explanatory power can, and probably do change at 
different stages of the process.  In Chapter 6 the cases of Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda and Uganda are presented in detail, followed by case analysis in Chapter 7.  
Chapter 8 will consolidate and discuss the major findings of the thesis. 
 The normative desirability of studying non-incumbent political parties as a factor 
in democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes rests on the fact that the most common form of 
autocracy today is made clandestine by elections,6 and while these elections produce a 
veneer of democracy to the international community, they also provide a realistic avenue 
to challenge incumbents without recourse to violence.7  All cases herein are hybrid 
regimes, and in all cases the incumbent has stood successfully for re-election in the 
context of elections where opposition parties have been allowed to contest.  Whilst 
incumbent turnover may be far more greatly correlated with open-seat elections,8 it could 
be argued that the ability of democratic opposition parties to compete in pro forma 
democracies, even where they lose, may be the most important factor for democratic 
outcomes in those regimes.  The testing and clarification of this position is of particular 
importance in the African context where political parties have come to be amongst the 
least trusted institutions,9 but where democracy as a form of governance is widely 
supported.10 
 
                                                          
6 Magaloni 2008, 727 
7 Ibidem 728 
8 See, for example: Cheeseman 2010, 139-153;  Howard and Roessler 2006, 365-381;  Rakner and van de 
Walle 2009a, 203, 205-206, 220 
9 Erdmann, Basedau, and Mehler 2007, 7 
10 See, for example: Joseph 2003, 164 
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Chapter 2: Theory 
 This chapter will discuss some of the definitional underpinnings of certain 
concepts used throughout this thesis, as well as the theory which informs its approach.  
Definitional specification will be discussed first, followed by theoretical review. 
What is intended by “electoral authoritarian,” “competitive authoritarian,” 
“hybrid,” et cetera is the breadth of the literature on hybrid regimes, and this thesis views 
as well as utilizes these terms as a largely synonymous “grey zone.”11  This thesis is 
therefore not concerned to engage within-category taxonomies,12 the generation of which 
is, unfortunately, still ongoing.  Such taxonomies are avoided in the least because they 
negate the distinct toward-democracy trajectory of these regimes in general over time,13 
as well as in African cases specifically.14  What is meant here by electoral 
authoritarianism, then, is a regime which has institutionalized the fundamental 
characteristics of democracy in a de jure sense, but which falls short of at least one 
minimal requirement of democracy in a de facto sense.15  In particular, this thesis is 
concerned with regimes where it is clear that one or all of the following minimal criteria 
of democracy are routinely violated: open, free and fair elections;16 universal suffrage;17 
political rights and civil liberties, in particular of association, free press, and ability to 
criticize the government;18 and the presence of a relatively even playing field between the 
                                                          
11 Howard and Roessler 2006, 365 
12 For example in: Armony and Schamis 2005, 113-128; Collier and Levitsky 2009, 269-288; Gilbert and 
Mohseni 2011, 270-297; Morlino 2009, 273-296; Schedler 2002, 36-50 
13 The complexity of this relationship is captured nicely in: Schedler 2010, 69-80 
14 van de Walle 2002, 66-67 
15 See, for example: Schmitter and Karl 1991, 75-88 
16 Levitsky and Way 2002, 53 
17 Ibidem 
18 Ibidem 
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incumbent and opposition parties.19  These regimes are distinguished from democracies 
by their systemic violation of these minimal criteria, and from authoritarian regimes by 
the fact that elections still take place, and are still taken seriously.20  The overarching 
characteristic of these regimes is that they are not imperfect democracies, and not 
“transitional,”21 but are regimes seeking to maintain the procedural illusion of democracy 
whilst constraining the risks of truly free competition.22 
Issues relating to democratic opposition parties in hybrid regimes are theorized in 
this thesis utilizing an integrative approach:23 at the structural-institutional level of the 
party system and the regime; and at the voluntarist level, regarding the agency of parties 
in legislature and in the public sphere generally.  As stated, it is the position of this thesis 
that democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes are driven by strong democratic opposition 
political parties, and that the strength of these parties lies in their ability to finance 
themselves, co-opt pre-existing organizational structures, and in the absence of effective 
institutions constructed by domestic regimes capable of exercising control over the party 
system.  Additional factors which may play a role in the ability of political parties to 
generate the capacity to effectively push the process of democratization forward include 
the distribution of salient identity cleavages, and in Africa in particular, ethnicity, as well 
as the presence or absence of violence in the party system, and party system 
fractionalization, including the presence of a large number of independent professional 
politicians.  
Party strength and its relationship to democratic outcomes has been theorized in a 
                                                          
19 Levitsky and Way 2010b 
20 Levitsky and Way 2002, 53-54 
21 Ottaway 2003, 6-7 
22 Ibidem 3; Levitsky and Way 2002, 51 
23 See: Mahoney and Snyder 1999, 3-32 
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number of ways, but for the purposes of this thesis “strength” is taken to be a quality 
which is indicated by the ability of a given non-incumbent political party to monopolize 
elected legislative seats which are not acquired by the incumbent,24 and the importance of 
party strength is conceptualized in contrast to the effects of party “weakness,” 
incoherence, and withdrawal. 
 In terms of party strength, an important component of political parties in hybrid 
regimes in the literature is the issue of party weakness, or “opposition weakness.”  
Weakness, in this regard, refers to the small size of multitudinous political parties in 
hybrid regimes,25 and their limited endurance over time,26 individually incapable of 
effectively competing with incumbent parties, and collectively unwilling to coalesce into 
a smaller number of larger and more competitive parties, or to form a collective 
opposition bloc.  Party weakness is important, particularly in Africa, because collective 
oppositions are correlated with electoral victory,27 whilst divided oppositions serve to 
preserve incumbent governments.28  This effect is thought to operate through the removal 
of votes from the incumbent, the reduction of the incumbent’s ability to divide the 
opposition and play its factions against one another, an increase in the perceived costs of 
repression and manipulation, and the realizable mobilization of voters against the 
incumbent.29  Strong opposition parties are thought to coordinate popular mobilization 
and carry political change forward, even in the face of reluctant incumbents,30 and it has 
                                                          
24 Lebas 2011, 27 
25 Rakner and van de Walle 2009a, 210 
26 Ibidem 210-211 
27 Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 198-200; Schedler 2009, 199-200; van de Walle 2006, 78 
28 Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 167-168; Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 71-72; Teshome 2008, 8; van de 
Walle 2006, 77 
29 Howard and Roessler 2006, 371 
30 Lebas 2011, 7 
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been theorized that it is the strength of the opposition which determines whether or not 
elections are indeed competitive, and whether democracy characterizes the relationship 
between government and society.31  It has been posited, furthermore, that it is not the 
resources or cohesiveness of ruling parties, but the strength or weakness of the opposition 
which determines authoritarian persistence.32 
Whilst “liberalizing electoral outcomes” may lie most strongly in the ability of the 
opposition to cohere,33 and therefore to generate a strong position, opposition cohesion 
appears to be correlated with perceptions regarding the probability of winning elections.34  
However, this should also mean that competitive authoritarian regimes seeking to win 
elections by smaller margins (thus avoiding the known correlation between exceptionally 
high vote percentages and authoritarian regimes), should ceterus paribus encourage 
stronger and more cohesive opposition parties.  Regarding this latter point, it could be 
suggested that the very occurrence of competitive authoritarian elections, hypothesized 
elsewhere as a causal factor in democratic outcomes,35 is actually acting on the dependent 
variable of democratic oppositionism, and that the cohesion and capacity of these 
opposition parties should be measurably increasing over the course of comparatively 
tightly won elections, unless incumbents take additional measures beyond allowing 
election results to be more evenly distributed.  By adopting this position this thesis 
dismisses certain structural-institutional hypotheses of opposition cohesion as tied to two-
round elections,36 presidential versus parliamentary systems,37 pre-regime history of 
                                                          
31 Ibidem 
32 Ibidem 8 
33 Howard and Roessler 2006, 375, 376 
34 van de Walle 2006, 86 
35 See, for example: Lindberg 2006a 
36 van de Walle 2006, 88 
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elections,38 cultural understandings of appropriate executive tenure,39 the absence of 
“ethnic” fragmentation,40 socioeconomic development,41 external pressure,42 and 
diaspora funding;43 whilst adopting a revised version of the thesis that elections are an 
independent variable on democratic outcomes, insofar as it suggests they are an 
independent variable on opposition strength.44   
 In addressing theories of how strong opposition parties gather strength and 
maintain coherence, the additional issue arises of participation of democratic opposition 
parties in the electoral process at all.  In the course of his research, Lindberg has found 
that it is more important for democratic outcomes that political parties participate in the 
electoral process and accept its results, than the quality of the overall process itself;45 and 
this position is adopted herein insofar as those factors being investigated are contingent 
on that participation taking place.  The primary factors which seem to influence whether 
participation and acceptance takes place are the freeness and fairness of elections,46 and 
the absence of electoral violence,47 whilst electoral system design and the participation or 
non-participation of old authoritarian rulers does not appear to be correlated with these 
outcomes.48  The obvious ambiguity here is the complex relationship that appears to exist 
between opposition participation and the freeness and fairness of elections.  The freeness 
                                                                                                                                                                             
37 Ibidem 89 
38 Ibidem 90 
39 Ibidem 
40 Ibidem 91 
41 Ibidem 
42 Ibidem  
43 Ibidem 92 
44 For Lindberg’s thesis see: Lindberg 2006a; Lindberg 2006c; see also: van de Walle 2002, 75 
45 Lindberg 2006b; Lindberg 2006d; Schedler 2009, 199 
46 Lindberg 2006d, 162 
47 Ibidem 159-160, although he only finds this correlation in presidential systems 
48 Ibidem 158-161 
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and fairness of elections are less important than the participation of the opposition, but 
that participation may turn on the freeness and fairness of elections.  In addition, in an 
earlier study of African democracy the active participation of a cohesive opposition was 
shown to be correlated with the freeness and fairness of elections.49 
 A large number of variables have been theorized as related to the ability of 
opposition parties to become strong, coherent and meaningful organizations in a given 
polity.  In order to maintain a manageable analysis this thesis attempts to discern and 
expound only those variables which may be logically understood to be of critical or 
integral importance.  As such, those theories relating to the financing and structural 
underpinning of opposition political parties will be discussed below, followed by theories 
regarding variable characteristics of party systems which may significantly impact the 
ability of political parties to generate strength, such as the presence or absence of 
violence, fractionalization, and salient identity based or ethnic cleavages. 
Of all the factors which structure the performance of parties, financing has been 
suggested to be of primary importance.50  This has been noted as a major obstacle for 
political parties in Africa specifically,51 and relates most logically to opposition strength 
in terms of the ability to run statewide electoral campaigns.52   
African party financing may be conceived of as occurring in three phases: the 
decolonization phase of mass-based parties funding themselves through membership, 
local patrons, and external agencies and governments interested in the outcome of 
decolonization; the conflation of ruling parties with the state, wherein finance shifted 
                                                          
49 Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 203 
50 Burnell 2007, 3 
51 See, for example: Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 167 
52 See, for example: Lebas 2011, 24 
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from party membership to state resources; and the return to multipartyism, wherein 
incumbent parties continued to fund themselves through state resources, whilst non-
incumbent parties had to utilize the strategies of grassroots funding, funding via local 
non-governmental organizations, and external funding from governments and unofficial 
foreign donors.53  Enquiring into party financing is important insofar as it likely separates 
successful from unsuccessful parties in competitive authoritarian regimes,54 primarily in 
the context that whilst it may be morally and financially infeasible to institutionalize state 
funding for political competition in less wealthy states,55 a defining characteristic of 
hybrid regimes is the funding of the incumbent through state resources, and the 
opposition through any other means.56  This vastly differential funding, furthermore, can 
corrupt the electoral process through the distribution of patronage and the use of the state 
toward partisan ends.57  The effect of patronage, in particular, may be amplified by the 
prevailing socioeconomic conditions characteristic of Africa such as extremely low 
incomes.58  It has been theorized, therefore, that the ability of the opposition to fund itself 
is correlated with opposition strength.59  An important structural factor related to party 
financing is the level of restriction on the sources of funding an opposition party may 
appeal to, namely the banning of foreign funding.60  There are reasonable justifications 
                                                          
53 Southall and Wood 2007, 202-203 
54 Burnell 2007, 11; Rakner and van de Walle 2009, 114 
55 Burnell 2007, 8 
56 Ottaway 2003, 147; Rakner and van de Walle 2009a, 205, 216-217; Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 
112 
57 See, for example: Gyimah-Boadi 2007, 29 
58 Ibidem 31 
59 Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 117 suggesting that this is a novel opposition strategy in Africa, and the 
obvious implication appears to be that it could lead to opposition success. 
60 Ottaway 2003, 150-151 
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for such a prohibition, such as preventing foreign interference in domestic politics,61 but 
in the context of less wealthy states where incumbents may appeal to state resources to 
fund campaigns or build/maintain popularity,62 while opposition parties may not, foreign 
funding may be the best opportunity for opposition parties to level the playing field. 
It has been suggested that opposition parties are more likely to acquire strength, as 
defined herein, where they are able to co-opt pre-existing organizational structures not 
restricted by societal cleavages such as region and identity.63  Although Lebas posits this 
primarily in the context of historic unionism,64 this concept should be expanded to 
include pre-existing organizational structures in general, and in the cases below it will be 
clear that it is pre-existing political structures in particular which this thesis attempts to 
address, although it is not suggested that there is a need to “precise” the theory to this 
level.  This more general approach is particularly important in the Great Lakes region, not 
included in Lebas’ qualitative study, where historic unionism certainly existed, but 
neither prevented the postcolonial/Cold War authoritarian tendency, nor definitively 
contributed to opposition formation in the contemporary period (although not absent).  It 
will also be clear that in looking to pre-existing political structures, as an aspect of what 
may be regarded as a broader applicable universe of potential structures, the established 
theory of “elite defection” is being inverted and it is being posited that it is the political 
networks and not the political prominence of defectors that strengthens the opposition.  
Taking this stance also provides a structural lens through which to account for the 
                                                          
61 Ibidem 151 
62 Dimitrov 2009, 79 
63 Lebas 2011, 5 
64 This is a central theme of Lebas’ work: Lebas 2011 
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importance of professional politicians, for example.65  Similarly, long duration grassroots 
party movements, such as those that attempt to start small by building parties at the local 
level first,66 are disregarded because there appears to be quite effective government 
preclusion of the ability of such movements to gain momentum in hybrid regimes.  This 
notion of structural inheritance, it should be noted, directly contradicts the position that 
the “short path to electoralism” is a major obstacle to opposition parties in new 
democracies.67   
 In line with the notion that the options available to democratic actors for acquiring 
power are limited to the democratic process, and are therefore much more limited than 
those available to incumbent and non-democratic opposition actors willing to use 
violence, coercion and manipulation,68 it is theorized that the presence of violence in the 
party system is negatively correlated with opposition strength, and that it is indicative of 
other factors theorized as being related to opposition weakness, such as weak rule of 
law.69 
 It is the position of this thesis that independent members and small parties, 
knowing that their chances of acquiring power are negligible, are incentivized to coalesce 
with incumbents.  Independent candidates in particular may run without a party label with 
the specific goal of being admitted to the winning party after elections,70 or may run as 
independents because they were unable to secure a party nomination but possess the 
                                                          
65 See, for example: Schmitter 2010, 26-27 
66 See, for example: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 117-118 where this is highlighted as an opposition 
strategy.  It is of note that one of the evidentiary examples utilized to convey this position is the Democratic 
Party in Uganda which is an absolute non-contender in comparison to the dominant opposition party. 
67 Carothers 2006, 53-58 
68 Ottaway 2003, 175 
69 See, for example: Carothers 2006, 58-60 
70 Rakner and van de Walle 2009a, 212-213; Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 112 
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independent resources to win a seat.71  It can be suggested, therefore, that a proliferation 
of independent members and small parties are inversely correlated with opposition 
strength.   
Regarding identity based “ethnic,” “regional,” et cetera parties, considered a 
general characteristic of African political parties,72 as well as African society generally,73 
it may be argued that because the interests of these parties are comparatively narrow, i.e. 
that they have no concern for brokerage policy or constituents external to their identity 
group, and where they do not form a majority and therefore the incumbent government, 
they may be easily co-opted by incumbents willing to acquiesce to some or all of their 
policy demands.  This position is borne out in the literature which considers “ethnic” 
parties in Africa as the building blocks of large political coalitions held together by 
patronage, which patronage lies more or less exclusively in the hands of incumbents.74  In 
this literature politicians attempting to break with ethnicity as a basis for political parties 
are regarded as both novel as well as largely unsuccessful.75  However, this position has 
been challenged by more recent work which suggests that local politics are more 
contentious than the “ethnic” position would suggest, and that party fragmentation at the 
national level is mirrored at the local even in “ethnically homogenous” regions.76  
Regardless of the interaction of ethnic parties with incumbents, it can be argued that their 
very presence in the party system is negatively correlated with democratic outcomes 
insofar as their appeal to, and politicization of identity, takes votes and competitiveness 
away from democratic opposition parties.  However, the ability of “ethnic” parties to do 
                                                          
71 See, for example: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 110-112 
72 Gyimah-Boadi 2007, 26-27; Erdmann 2007, 37 
73 See, for example in the context of party research: Erdmann 2007, 44-45 
74 Ibidem 46 
75 Ibidem 47 
76 Lebas 2011, 33 
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so may have been rooted in the “collapsed state” phenomenon, and prior to that the 
structural distribution of power in the colonial regimes, both of which may only represent 
temporary aberrations; while much research in addition has been produced on the 
propensity of citizens to turn to ethnic associations in the context of scarce resources and 
benefits traditionally provided by the state.77   
Given that the level of analysis with which this thesis is concerned is the party 
system and aggregate electoral outcomes, and not individual voter preferences, the 
investigation of ethnicity herein shall be confined to the presence or absence of obvious 
ethnically based parties, whether de jure or de facto.  As noted above, one of the 
predominant concerns of this thesis is the investigation of the co-optation of cross-cutting 
organizational structure not limited by societal cleavages such as ethnicity.  This is not to 
say that if one surveyed electors in a given state regarding a particular election one would 
not find that ethnicity played an important role in their decision making, neither is this 
qualification an indication that this thesis is in a position to contradict research which 
indicates that this may not be the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 See, for example: Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004; Emizet 1999, 185-228 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
As mentioned above, the primary alternative hypotheses of democratic outcomes 
can be broadly categorized into structural, institutional and voluntarist factors.  Some of 
the most important structural hypotheses of democratic outcomes have focused on the 
importance of the socioeconomic system, and the impact of the international system, on 
democratic outcomes; while widely known institutional hypotheses have focused on 
executive and electoral design; and the most perdurable voluntarist hypotheses have 
focused on pacts.   
In regard to socioeconomic hypotheses, which are closely related to 
modernization theories of democracy, the most enduring has been the correlation of 
wealth and democracy, where wealth is taken to be an indicator of economic 
development.  While thresholds of strong correlation between absolute GDP figures and 
democracy have been located in past research,78 as well as more recently, this hypothesis 
has been unable to reliably account for the institutionalization of democracy: income can 
only be shown to be correlated with the stability of democratic (and possibly any) 
systems.79  That being said, this correlation is broadly accepted in the literature,80 and 
even critical perspectives on the relationship between economic development and 
democracy maintain the association between economic development and democracy in 
the “old” world and poverty and autocracy in “new” countries; the caveat being that 
“new” countries have simply remained poor as well as autocratic.81  To be fair, this 
                                                          
78 See, for example: Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 155-183; Geddes provides an overview of research on 
this relationship in: Geddes 1999, 117-119; see also Lawson 1999, 8 for a synthesis from the even older 
literature (Lipset and Dahl). 
79 This was the overall implication of the research conducted in, for example: Przeworski and Limongi 
1997 
80 See, for example: Carothers 2006, 60-61 
81 Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 176 
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theory does not suggest that democracy cannot be established in poor states, it suggests 
only that it is unlikely to survive.82  Newer research, however, suggests that in isolating 
African cases it can be shown that poverty, through the intervention of aid, is actually 
positively correlated with democratic outcomes,83 whilst older research has long 
suggested a relationship between poor economic performance and authoritarian 
breakdown.84 
It is the position of this thesis that emerging democracies in less wealthy states in 
the contemporary world present a gap not explained by the literature which focuses on 
the relationship between wealth, as an indicator of socioeconomic development, and 
democracy.  While negative cases typically exist, and certainly have throughout the 
duration of this literature, the number of negative cases present today, particularly where 
one allows oneself to account for toward democracy movement in hybrid regimes, gives 
call for a reassessment of this position.  It is the position of this thesis, not that 
socioeconomic theories are without merit, but that important changes occur and have 
occurred in the international states system, and within given states whence they become 
hybrid regimes, that alter the impact of traditionally important factors, such as wealth, on 
democratic outcomes.  A reassessment is particularly in order when studying African 
cases, where economic wealth is outside the reach of the vast majority of citizens, but 
where few states could be considered to be purely authoritarian regimes today.   
Regarding international influences, the most recent and coherent theory of the 
effect of the international system on democratic outcomes has been the theory of linkage 
                                                          
82 Ibidem 169 
83 See: Boduszynski and Englebert 2008, 29-49 
84 Geddes 1999, 140 
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and leverage, argued by Levitsky and Way.85  In this conceptualization linkage and 
leverage are thought to explain why states become democracies, competitive 
authoritarian regimes, or remain autocratic.86  Leverage is defined as a government’s 
vulnerability to external pressure, which vulnerability is primarily grounded in the size 
and strength of its economy, the presence or absence of competing foreign policy 
objectives between western states, and the presence or absence of “black knight” 
support.87  Linkage is defined as the density of political, economic, social, diplomatic and 
organizational ties, as well as the extent of cross border flows of capital, goods and 
services, people and information between a given state and the U.S. and pre-2004 
members of the European Union.88  Linkage is thought to work through the mechanism 
of shaping the incentives, interests and capabilities of governments vis-à-vis their 
citizenry.89   
This thesis does not call into question that both linkage and leverage play 
meaningful roles in democratic outcomes within specified parameters, but there are 
several important gaps in this theorization of the effects of the international system on 
democratic outcomes, namely: that the impact of linkage and leverage are severely 
dependent on additional factors, such as the strength and organizational capacity of 
incumbent governments to resist leverage; that they are meaningfully contaminated by 
other hypotheses, such as the material ability of persons to form linkages as coded by 
Levitsky and Way;90 that the empirical coding of linkage is over-determined in 
                                                          
85 See, for example: Levistky and Way 2010a 
86 See, for example: Ibidem 50-54 
87 Ibidem  40-43 
88 Ibidem 43 
89 Ibidem 45-50 
90 For coding and conceptualization, wherein I should note that the former does not fully account for the 
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meaningful ways, such as the importance of geographical proximity to the West;91 and 
finally that this theory makes important admissions regarding the present study, namely 
the overall importance of opposition mobilization.92  While the theory of linkage and 
leverage may explain democratization within certain parameters, such as why 
comparatively wealthy states in the Americas and western Eurasia became democracies 
after the Cold War, without accounting for their history of democracy or the democratic 
influence of potential membership in the European Union or Organization of American 
States,  whilst the more easterly Eurasian states have not, for which the heavy 
explanatory power and coding weight accorded to geography is questionable; the theory 
presents a wide gap concerning Sub-Saharan Africa insofar as it neither adequately 
explains nor harbors any expectation of democracy in the region, which is characterized 
by Levitsky and Way as medium to high in leverage but low in linkage.93  This particular 
confluence of linkage and leverage would mean that hybrid regimes in Africa are 
essentially explained by their broad poverty and geographic location, a somewhat 
problematic position which certainly merits another investigation.   
While poverty and natural resource wealth comprise only the most significant, but 
not the universe of measures utilized in the analysis of leverage, it is nevertheless worth 
questioning its applicability in the African context.  The remaining components of this 
relationship would have to be explained by the organizational capacity of incumbent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
latter, see: Levitsky and Way 2005, 22-23; Levitsky and Way 2006, 383-384; and, in particular Levistky 
and Way 2010a, 374-375 Appendix III – Measuring Leverage 
91 A problem noted also in: Fairbanks 2009, 85; for the importance given to geographical proximity see: 
Levitsky and Way 2010a, 374-375; Levitsky and Way 2005, 23 and on page 30 it is noted that all of sub-
Saharan Africa is characterized by the absence of linkage; In a later work Levitsky and Way indicate that 
colonial heritage may also be an indicator of linkage, a safe caveat that is never actually included in their 
operational analyses, see: Levitsky and Way 2006, 384 
92 See, for example: Way 2009, 94-96 wherein Way reneges on his original position that opposition 
participation is a poor indicator of its success, in: Way 2008, 59;  See also: Way 2010, 235 
93 See, for example: Levistky and Way 2010a, 237-308 
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governments, the possession of nuclear arms, or “black knight” support by a non-Western 
state.  It may be contended that the first remaining variable is irrelevant insofar as it is 
assumed in the context of this analysis, at least vis-à-vis the opposition; the second 
variable is now inapplicable in Sub-Saharan Africa; and the cut-off for the coding of the 
third variable, 1 per cent of GDP in bilateral aid from a “black knight,” is so low in the 
context of highly impoverished states that it simply provides a measure to make the 
model work in the face of significant contrary evidence.94  It is worth noting, in addition, 
that it is because of the meaningful incorporation of natural resource wealth into the 
theory of leverage that this otherwise prominent and controversial theory of the 
relationship between natural resource endowments and democratic outcomes is not 
considered herein.95 
Whilst exogenous pressures certainly play an important role, this thesis is 
concerned primarily with domestic factors, and is geared toward the critical investigation 
of some of the literature which deprives those domestic factors of importance vis-à-vis 
structural explanations.  The gaps in the linkage and leverage theories are where and how 
they fail to explain democracy, and domestically driven toward democracy movement, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
On a broad note, the position of this thesis regarding structural influences 
generally is that they may play an important role in democratic outcomes within their 
specified parameters, and particularly when considering movement from essentially 
authoritarian regimes, but that in hybrid regimes the role of structure at most dictates the 
level of opposition activity required, not the possibility or impossibility of those 
                                                          
94 Particular coding schemes, which go well beyond what the body of the text accounts for, can be found in: 
Levistky and Way 2010a, 372-373, Appendix II – Measuring Leverage 
95 On this subject, one might look to, for example: Dunning 2008; Luong and Weinthal 2010; Ross 2001 
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outcomes, nor even necessarily their likelihood;96 although structure may ex post 
correlate to the chronological distribution of democratization in the post-communist 
world.97  It is precisely these after the event correlations which may have caused 
significant problems in democratization theory across time, in particular the temptation to 
infer causation backward based on patterned distributions of structural variables that may 
only be historical artefacts possessed of temporary stability. 
Regarding institutional theories of democratization, the most influential have been 
those regarding the design of government, and the design of the electoral system.  In 
terms of the former, it has been broadly hypothesized that parliamentary systems bear a 
greater association with democratic outcomes than do presidential systems.  This 
hypothesis is founded on the assumption that executives in parliamentary systems are 
embedded in a house of elected representatives, are responsible to that house, and are 
thereby more constrained, whereas presidents do not sit in a house of elected 
representatives, and operate, therefore, with greater autonomy and less responsibility.98  
This theory has also been satisfactorily applied within the African context specifically.99  
A secondary hypothesis, relevant to this thesis in particular, is that presidential systems 
also weaken parties and party systems because executive authority has a level of 
detachment from parliament, where parties sit, and both citizens and leaders are thereby 
less interested in weakened parties and their parliamentarians.100   
The gaps presented by this literature lie in the significant amount of negative 
                                                          
96 See also, for example: Beissinger 2009, 74-77; Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 69-73; Way 2010, 235 
97 Silitski 2009, 87 
98 See, in particular: Fish 2005, 193-245; and also: Carothers 2006, 64-65; Fish 1998, 132-134, 139 M. 
Stephen Fish also strongly claims that “muscular multipartyism” is also strongly correlated with democratic 
outcomes, and suggests that parties should be treated as “prime movers” on page 140. 
99 See, for example: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 112-115 
100 See, for example in the African context: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 112-115 
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cases which reside at both ends of the spectrum, i.e. a large number of democratic 
presidential systems, and parliamentary systems which are autocratic or have spent 
significant periods of time as autocratic in nature.  There is certainly no definitive feature 
of parliamentary governance which necessarily negates the possibility of 
authoritarianism. 
Regarding voluntarist theories, the most enduring has been the idea of “pacted” 
transitions between incumbent and opposition leaders.101  Whilst this paradigm is useful, 
there are several critical gaps in the context of a thesis of this nature.  Firstly, one must 
question why incumbents undertake pacts, and how firm their commitments are to those 
pacts.  As was the case in several Great Lakes states, pacts can be undertaken in moments 
of incumbent weakness, and can be ignored whence a secure footing is regained.  
Secondly, one must question with whom these pacts are undertaken.  Pacts with insurgent 
military groups, or minor opposition parties, may not be useful for democracy, and as is 
historically evident in at least one of the cases below, may serve to preserve the 
undemocratic system.  The former might be useful for peace, but the latter may simply be 
a tool to break up the opposition.  Finally, the relationship between democracy as an 
outcome of pacts has been challenged.102 
 The general position this thesis adopts in relation to the broader literature is that 
the liberalization of authoritarian regimes only leads to democracy where democratic 
ideas and organizations exist under the repression of that authoritarianism,103 and the 
absence of authoritarianism is not the presence of democracy, nor the empowerment of 
                                                          
101 See, for example: O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, referencing in particular the brief summations offered 
in chapters 3 and 4. 
102 Geddes 1999,140; and, perhaps most importantly in: Schmitter 2010, 23 
103Ottaway 2003, 9 
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democratic opposition parties.104  What is logically critical in hybrid regimes, in which 
all or many of the legal and definitional trappings of democracy are present, are active 
opposition parties to enliven the system, to criticize government, and to provide a 
realistic alternative to electors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104 Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 70-71 
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Chapter 4: Research Design, Methodology, and Case Selection 
 In this chapter the details of the design of this thesis, the methodologies it 
employs, and the selection of its cases, will be detailed.  This chapter commences with a 
discussion of its research design generally, followed by methodological discussion, and is 
concluded with a discussion regarding case selection. 
 This thesis will pursue a programmatic mixed methods approach to the research 
questions, including substantial quantitative as well as qualitative analysis.105  Regarding 
the former, the research questions that can be addressed quantitatively will be posited 
both to a large-N world dataset, as well as to an identical but smaller Sub-Saharan Africa 
dataset.  This approach should have the effect of lending a degree of validity to the 
findings, insofar as this thesis is predominantly concerned with democracy in the context 
of African politics.  In the quantitative portion of the analysis only the most technically 
correct applicable statistics and, ultimately, the most parsimonious and conservative 
models will be utilized in order to avoid the risk the results become confused or highly 
qualified.106 
 In terms of data sources, this thesis relies predominantly on the World 
Development Indicators, Africa Development Indicators, Database of Political 
Institutions, and Polity IV datasets; and mathematical calculations on data thereupon.  
Although the latter dataset may be controversial as an unqualified indicator of 
                                                          
105 This approach is labelled as “programmatic” in the sense that it is pursuing distinct questions with 
distinct methodological approaches, as opposed to other more integrated approaches to mixed methods, all 
of which designs are highlighted in: Creswell and Clark 2007 
106 Aside from simply wishing to only pursue absolutely correct operations given the data at hand on a 
technical level, which is often not the case, this thesis has also been influenced toward easily interpretable 
and simple operations by some of the arguments in: Ray 2005; and the complimentary articles: Achen 
2005; Clark 2005; 341-352 
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democracy,107 it is nevertheless widely utilized for large-N analyses due the facts that: 1) 
it is unparalleled in terms of the number of observations and the timeframe available; and 
2) it provides a much needed common language for scholars wishing to pursue studies of 
democracy and autocracy coded in a gradated, as opposed to dichotomous manner.  
Because there may be controversy between research which approaches democracy as 
absolute and dichotomous versus gradated,108 it should be made explicit that a gradated 
measure of democracy has been elected because this thesis is specifically concerned with 
variation on the dependent variable, i.e. democratic outcomes, with increased analytic 
differentiation on the dependent variable in order to capture diversity,109 and with this 
variation in regimes which would otherwise simply remain static as non-democracies 
throughout nearly all of the period under investigation.  The Polity IV dataset is recoded 
in two manners for the purposes of this thesis: firstly, by adding 10 points to all scores 
which normally range from -10 to +10 yielding an all positive integer scale ranging from 
0-20, in which all scores at 16 and above are taken to indicate a democracy; and, 
secondly, where that 0-20 scale is reduced to 5 ordinal grades for certain cross 
tabulations, where 5 indicates the 16-20 democracy score, and preceding numbers 
represent descending increments of four points.  In both recoding schemes transitional 
values are recoded as missing and excluded from analysis.     
The remaining three datasets are all generated and maintained by the World Bank 
and are not generally regarded as highly problematic or flawed sources of information.  
From the World Development Indicators and Africa Development Indicators, the latter 
being an identical subset, this thesis utilizes the following information: GDP per capita in 
                                                          
107 See, for example: Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Marshall, Gurr, Davenport and Jaggers 2002 
108 See, for example: Collier and Adcock 1999 
109 Collier and Levitsky 2009, 269 
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current United States dollars; and natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP.  GDP 
per capita in current United States dollars is elected simply for the parsimony and ease of 
interpretation granted by the measure, and natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP 
in order to generate an easy to utilize interval-ratio level measurement.  The Database of 
Political Institutions is utilized for its measurements and loggings of system type, e.g. 
presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential; electoral system type, e.g. proportional 
representation or other; and measurements of opposition seats held by the largest 
opposition party, and total seats held by the opposition. 
In terms of the data coding, due to large amounts of missing data, in regard to 
Africa in particular, and the difficult questions that come with deciding how to 
manipulate that missing data, the data available has been recoded from the interval-ratio 
level to the ordinal level.  It is the position of this thesis that coding precise and absolute 
interval-ratio data into larger ordinal grades provides a basis to more safely posit the 
values of otherwise missing data than, for example, to infer precise numbers taken 
through the operation of averages.  Finally, as has become the norm in large-N political 
science quantitative analyses, the number of observations available for use in the dataset 
has been maximized by coding the data into country years, producing thereby 22 
mathematically distinct observations for every state in the dataset in the 1989-2010 
period.  In the operations below this data is used both as a broad cross-section in order to 
investigate general correlation, as well as, where appropriate, utilized longitudinally in 
order to investigate the temporal order of correlation.  
In order to develop a quantitative measure of “opposition strength” it is inferred 
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that strong opposition parties are those which monopolize the opposition vote.110  This 
thesis appeals to the monopolization of the opposition primarily due to the contention that 
absolute vote proportions between incumbent and opposition in electoral competition are 
unreliable in contexts that may be significantly characterized by electoral fraud on the 
part of undemocratic incumbents amongst other factors.111  Adapting this originally 
qualitative conceptualization from Lebas is in expostulation both to the dangers of the 
alternative of absolute quantification of the opposition vis-à-vis the universe of votes, as 
well as the weak relationship found between that operationalization of opposition 
strength and democratic outcomes.112  Secondly, this thesis contends that the most 
coherent manner in which to test this particular operationalization of opposition strength 
is in terms of the monopolization of opposition seats (as opposed to votes).  This is 
posited to be the case because voting patterns are only theoretically salient at electoral 
intervals, whereas it can be assumed that seat allocation continues to have a function in 
the years between elections, i.e. that opposition members are participating in politics.  In 
order to generate this number, firstly, the number of seats held by the largest opposition 
party is divided by the total number of seats held by the opposition, and the resulting 
quotient is multiplied by 100; and secondly, where appropriate, ordinal grades into which 
the product of the previous operation is converted are generated, for reasons both of 
compatibility with the ordinal data already in use, as well as for those arguments for 
ordinal conversion highlighted above. 
There are at least two major interacting variables over which this thesis attempts 
                                                          
110 Lebas 2011, 27 adopted from one of three indicators of opposition strength, although Lebas does not 
believe these can be utilized as standalone measures. 
111 See, for example: Ibidem 26 
112 As in, for example: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b,109-111 
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to exert control in concentrating on the opposition as an insular system, namely the extent 
of vote rigging in undemocratic regimes, and the extent of the protest vote.  The unknown 
dimensions of these variables in a given competitive authoritarian regime are at once the 
justification for avoiding the absolute analysis of the opposition vis-à-vis the 
incumbent,113 but may certainly also contaminate the opposition vote when it is 
considered in and of itself.  While some argue there is no competitive advantage in the 
manipulation of votes by authoritarian incumbents vis-à-vis other forms of electoral 
manipulation, the fact is that if the incumbent is capable of manipulating the proportion 
of votes it does not receive, it is capable also of manipulating the allocation of non-
incumbent votes.  It may not be possible, therefore, to discern what form of manipulation 
has taken place.   
This thesis argues that there is utility in electoral data from hybrid regimes, and 
that the analysis of the opposition as an insulated system provides some protection from 
the effects of vote manipulation which, while it is certainly exists, can be delimited 
neither as marginal nor as totalizing.  The ultimate decisions on the utility of this data, 
and on the probable extent of vote rigging in hybrid regimes, obviously, must be left to 
individual readers and their interpretation of the scholarly and professional literature at 
large.   
In terms of the major opposition parties, furthermore, it may not be possible to 
determine what proportion of votes were garnered by the opposition’s electoral 
campaign, and what proportion of votes are merely an indication of discontent with the 
incumbent.  The theoretical weight and relevance of the protest vote is, therefore, also left 
to the reader, as this thesis has no basis upon which to define its actual parameters in the 
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cases at hand. 
The particular operations utilized, as mentioned, are restricted to the most 
technically correct, parsimonious and conservative available.  This approach is taken 
largely because this thesis constitutes a more or less initial investigation.  Most of the 
data is presented below in the form of cross-tabulations and the related statistical 
measures of independence and association.   
For all cross-tabulations Pearson’s chi-squared statistic is presented, although the 
necessity of this presentation is debatable given that this thesis is dealing with a 
longitudinally ordered universe of cases, and not a sample of cases from that universe.  
Pearson’s chi squared statistic, therefore, is included as a formality based on the fact that 
a temporal truncation on the parameters of the universe of cases has taken place, and in 
regard to the fact that it is a base calculation for non-parametric statistical measures of 
association for nominal variables.  In line with the latter, Cramer’s phi statistic is 
included in categorical tables.  Additionally, because this thesis is dealing in what can be 
regarded as the population of cases, and not a sample thereof, retests of established 
theories are subjected to hypothesis testing as the primary hypothesis, i.e. where the null 
hypothesis remains that these positions do not reflect the empirical universe.  That being 
the case, no weights or statistical adjustments are applied to the Pearson chi-squared 
statistic, as the basic null hypothesis assumption of uniform distribution is adopted.  
There are additional reasons for taking such an approach to the chi-squared statistic, the 
most relevant of which is the danger of type II error when statistically adjusting for low 
null hypothesis expectations not based on uniform distribution.  Should such adjustments 
be made in the context of a retest and the null hypothesis fail to be rejected, given the 
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known danger of type II error, it would be advisable to revert to the very approach this 
thesis has elected to utilize as it stands.   
Where all data in a given cross-tabulation is at the ordinal level or better, 
additional measures of non-parametric association are included, comprised herein of 
Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma, Kendall’s tau, and Spearman’s rho.  Gamma is included 
due to its mathematical similarity to tau, and it is simply the position of this thesis that 
reporting these measures in tandem is more useful than not, while the differential value of 
these measurements is left to the reader.   
In the cases where nominal and dichotomous variables are being tested against 
ordinal or interval-ratio level data this thesis utilizes the difference of means t-test, as 
well as cross tabulation with Pearson’s chi squared and Cramer’s phi statistics.   
Finally, in the interest of parsimony, longitudinal data is presented as variation in 
central tendency across time based on a “year zero” which is the first year a given state 
qualifies for inclusion, and raw data is included in an appendix.  Recoding applicable 
cases in this manner prevents late entry cases from skewing the effect of those variables 
under consideration as concerns early entry cases.  The reader is encouraged to analyse 
the raw data for him or herself in order to discern the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of more rigorous longitudinal tests, which this thesis has avoided due 
to the uncontrolled acquisition of cases which are posited herein to pose a logically 
similar problem to that of attrition more typical of longitudinal studies.   
In terms of the qualitative portion of this analysis, multiple case secondary 
analysis will be conducted with comparative method and purposive sampling case 
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selection criteria.114  This thesis utilizes multiple cases in order to test predefined 
hypotheses,115 but also allows room for induction from the data at hand.116  The primary 
object of the qualitative portion of the analysis is to analyze how strong opposition parties 
come to be strong.  The inability to fully capture this process with quantitative data has to 
do with the facts that not all data can be made numerically discrete, that some of this data 
which cannot be quantified may be the same data this thesis is attempting to capture in 
this analysis, and that even where it is clear that many of the variables could be usefully 
quantified, such data is simply not available for secondary analysis, i.e. has not yet been 
gathered.117 
Although it has been noted that party-system based explanations can be unreliable 
predictors of political outcomes in Africa,118 this should not be taken prima facie given 
the lack of reliability highlighted in other broad theoretical approaches as concerns 
African cases, and it is the position of this thesis that logical relationships should be 
investigated.  This thesis conceives of the “party-system” as the nature and stability of 
interactions between parties operating in an intermediate position between government 
and society.119 
 In selecting the particular cases of states in the Great Lakes region this thesis 
                                                          
114 For an understanding of “multiple case secondary analysis” in general as opposed to a strictly 
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intends the elimination of a number of variables which would otherwise have to be 
addressed.120  Purposively selecting from a group of states that at once represent a 
proximate enough region to lend validity to the analysis, whilst individually originating 
in different histories of authoritarian politics and coalescing into a singular form of 
“blocked transition” hybrid regime over the past several decades;121 which form 
contemporarily embraces a liberal multiparty based conceptualization of democracy, 
allow this thesis to disregard questions of equivalence.122  In so doing, it is also possible 
to eliminate consideration of the correlations between authoritarian regime type and 
democratic outcomes,123 and furthermore this thesis understands the concept of a 
“blocked transition” to be widely congruent with competitive authoritarianism and et 
cetera.  However, while purposively selecting the cases, electing to focus on Uganda and 
DRC where there are relatively strong opposition parties, and Rwanda where there is not, 
and in selecting these cases without regard to their absolute state of democracy other than 
that they cannot be consolidated democracies; this thesis also seeks to avoid issues 
associated with selection bias in comparative research.124  In this sample Uganda 
constitutes the “crucial” case125 where a relatively strong opposition party has been 
carved out of the prior “no party” organizational structure of the incumbent; Rwanda 
forms a “diverse”126 case wherein pro forma democracy exists and multipartyism is legal, 
but no strong opposition party has yet arisen; and finally, the Democratic Republic of 
                                                          
120 For the logic of the use of the comparative method to eliminate irrelevant variables from analysis see, 
for example: Frendreis 1983, 262; Meckstroth 1975, 137 
121 See, for example: van de Walle 2002, 68-73; Bratton and van de Walle 1997 
122 For the problem of equivalence in comparative research see, for example: Przeworski and Teune 1970, 
106-130 
123 For example as presented in: Geddes 1999, 115-144; or as eventually questioned by Schmitter in: 
Schmitter 2010, 22-23 
124 See, for example: Collier and Mahoney 1996, 56-91; Geddes, 1990, 131-150 
125 See, for example: Gerring 2007, 231-253 
126 Gerring and Seawright 2008, 301 
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Congo, due to its unique recent history, forms both a “crucial” case in a similar manner to 
Uganda as concerns the Mouvement de Libération du Congo, but also forms a “deviant” 
case,127 as concerns the Union pour Démocratie et le Progrès Social.  Due to the 
significant across case differences, but the highly similar and even cross-contaminated 
nature of the respective political systems, the various forms of cases are drawn together 
herein in a mixed most similar systems, but also most different systems design.  Uganda 
and DRC constitute the MDS design, whilst Uganda and DRC vis-à-vis Rwanda will 
comprise an MSS paired comparison128 where the former two represent “positive” cases 
and the latter represents a “negative” case.129 
 Finally, this thesis elects to conduct the analysis within the temporal frame 1989-
2010 in both the quantitative and qualitative portion of the analysis as applicable.  In not 
analyzing African politics prior to 1989 it is possible to exclude several otherwise 
important variables from the analysis, in particular the impact of Cold War alliances on 
regime type in African states and elsewhere, arguably the cause, or a crucial factor in, a 
significant number of aberrations in regime type in otherwise historical democracies.130  
Following the end of the Cold War and the removal of anti-democratic exogenous 
pressures, many states in Africa and around the world that entered statehood and/or the 
Cold War period as democratic states have discretely returned to that form of governance, 
or are arguably in the process of such a return.131  Utilizing data from prior to the Cold 
                                                          
127 Ibidem 303 
128 See, for example: Tarrow 2010 
129 Selecting Rwanda as a negative case follows the logic for negative case selection that does not require 
the negative case to be characterized by the presence of the Independent Variables and/or mechanisms and 
the absence of the Dependent Variable or outcome, only that the outcome of interest is theoretically 
possible, id est the “possibility principle” as found in: Goertz and Mahoney 2004, 653-669 
130 See, for example: Magaloni 2008, 737-738 wherein the author conceded that statistical work conducted 
on regime change over a period including the Cold War could be significantly contaminated. 
131 This position is broadly supported in the Africanist literature, for example in: McFerson 2010, 66-68 
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War period cannot be done in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, as most contemporary 
states were formal colonies for some time prior to this period, and the quality of our 
knowledge of pre-colonial and/or pre-contact systems is highly variable; extensive where 
there was prolonged contact with a centralized kingdom, and suspect as concerns our 
understanding of “tribes” encountered, or invented for the purposes of political 
domination.132  Additionally, even where those centralized political systems have existed, 
the colonial encounter served to dismantle (exempli gratia: Kongo), alter (e.g. Rwanda), 
or incorporate them into larger political bodies (e.g. Buganda); thus making their politics 
of little relevance to this analysis, which is concerned with the Westphalian/postcolonial 
state the political elite (controversially) elected to retain in the era of independence.133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
wherein McFerson characterizes the period from 1989 forward as one of “fragile progress,” 1995-2002 as 
one of “backsliding” and 2002 forward as “recovery;” in pages 68-70 McFerson details some of the 
contaminating issues; see also, for example: Nugent 2004, 369 
132 These aspects of the colonial encounter are analysed most notably in: Mamdani 1996; Young 1994 
133 The history of such decisions and their alternatives may be found in general histories such as: Freund 
1984; Herbst 2000 
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Chapter 5: Quantitative Results  
In this chapter the thesis seeks to expose the posited relationship between strong 
opposition parties and democratic outcomes to empirical testing, as well as predominant 
hypotheses from the broader literature expounded above.  The reason for the latter series 
of testing is that it is the position of this thesis that the nature of these established 
relationships may change in the post-Cold War period, and in hybrid as opposed to 
authoritarian regimes.  The chapter will commence with an empirical investigation of 
certain hypotheses from the broader literature, followed by an investigation of the 
relationship between strong opposition parties and democratic outcomes. 
When the temporal boundaries of the analysis are restricted to the years 1989 
through 2010, the correlation between wealth and democracy broadly holds on the global 
level, as illustrated by Table 1 below. 
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Table 1 indicates that there is a tendency in all states with a GDP per capita of 
greater than $2 per day, and particularly in states with a GDP per capita of greater than 
$6247.27 per year, toward democracy.  The results of the non-parametric measures of 
association for cross-tabulated ordinal data also suggest that a meaningful amount of 
variation in democracy is explained by GDP per capita.  It is of note, however, that the 
statistical results of this correlation are heavily influenced by states which are not 
impoverished, whereas states in the lowest income category, with a GDP per capita of $2 
Table 1: GDP Per Capita and Democracy in the World 1989-2010
Polity Score Total
GDP 1 2 3 4 5
1 209 221 168 141 254 993
2 214 187 58 173 766 1398
3 78 14 4 10 291 397
4 54 3 18 0 429 504
Total 555 425 248 324 1740 3292
Pearson chi2 720.3723 Pr .000...
Gamma 0.4471 ASE 0.02
Kendall's tau-b 0.3047 ASE 0.014
Spearman 0.3548 Pr .0000...
* GDP per capita in current USD
Recoded into ordinal values where 1 = $2 per day or less, 2 = middle as defined
by World Development Indicators (lower middle, middle, upper middle) where
not included in the prior category, 3 = high, as values greater than the upper limit
of upper middle ($6247.27) as defined by World Development Indicators in 2010, 
and where 4 = all values at $18,000 and above
After recoding into broad ordinal values, missing data was averaged according to
the preceding and proceeding available data
** Polity Scores were generated using the plus ten method of generating
all-positive scores
The resulting 0-20 scale was recoded into quintiles where 0-3=1, 4-7=2, 8-11=3,
12-15=4 and 16-20=5, where 1 = undemocratic and 5 = democratic
All transitional polity scores (-88. -77, -66) were recoded as missing, and missing
data was, therefore, not manipulated
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per day or less, are fairly evenly distributed across gradations of democracy in this time 
period (Table 2).  
 
This latter finding is not expected by the theory iterated above.  The important 
caveat is that, whilst a singular indicator such as GDP per capita is and has been an 
acceptable simplification of the relationship that modernization theory and its more 
contemporary revisions posit between economic development and/or capitalism and 
democracy, the theory itself can be much “thicker” and more complex than this indicator 
can account for.134  This finding is of particular importance for the study of African 
politics where the majority of states fall within the low income category (Table 3), and 
where the statistical relationship between wealth and democracy is significantly weaker 
across the same time period (Table 4).   
                                                          
134 See, for example: Boix 2003; Lipset 1981; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992 
Table 2: GDP Per Capita and Democracy in the World 1989-2010,
where GDP Per Capita is $2 Per Day or Less
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Polity Score
1 209 21.05 21.05
2 221 22.26 43.3
3 168 16.92 60.22
4 141 14.2 74.42
5 254 25.58 100
Total 993 100
* See notes for Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity Score
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As Table 3 illustrates 68 per cent of African cases fall in the extremely low income 
category possessing a GDP per capita of $2 per day or less, whilst 96 per cent of the 
African cases fall within the first two income categories.  In Table 4 one can see that the 
statistical measures of association for non-parametric ordinal cross-tabulation have 
decreased in strength by over 50 per cent in all cases, and the tau and rho statistics can be 
regarded as more or less insignificant.  The reason for this is evident in the Table 4 cross-
Table 3: GDP Per Capita in Africa 1989-2010
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
GDP 1 722 68.37 68.37
2 295 27.94 96.31
3 36 3.41 99.72
4 3 0.28 100
Total 1056 100
* see notes for Table 1 regarding the coding of GDP per
capita
Table 4: GDP Per Capita and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010
Polity Score Total
GDP 1 2 3 4 5
1 93 168 137 84 136 618
2 42 61 17 28 123 271
3 0 8 0 2 7 17
4 0 3 0 0 0 3
Total 135 240 154 114 266 909
Pearson Chi2 84.1078 Pr .000...
Gamma 0.2051 ASE 0.051
Kendall's tau-b 0.122 ASE 0.031
Spearman's rho 0.1364 Pr .0000...
* see notes for Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity scores
and the coding of GDP per capita
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tabulation itself where it is clear that there is no definitive relationship between income 
and either democracy or autocracy when all African observations between 1989 and 2010 
are treated as a large cross section. 
The absence of this relationship in broad cross section is further complicated by 
the fact that Sub-Saharan African states entered the post-Cold War period as 
predominantly poor and autocratic (see Table 5), whereas across the period 1989-2010 
there has been a very significant shift away from purely authoritarian governance (see 
Table 6), with only a minor shift toward greater individual wealth (see Table 7). 
 
Table 5 provides a base indication that the wealth and democracy hypothesis is valid at 
the commencement of the post-Cold War period with a significant association between 
poverty and autocracy evident in the cross-tabulation and reflected in the non-parametric 
statistical measures of ordinal correlation.   
Table 5: GDP Per Capita and Democracy in Africa 1990
Polity Score Total
GDP 1 2 3 4 5
1 24 3 0 1 1 29
2 6 1 2 1 3 13
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 30 4 2 2 4 42
Pearson Chi2 10.1825 Pr 0.037
Gamma 0.6726 ASE 0.177
Kendall's tau-b 0.3857 ASE 0.145
Spearman's rho 0.4056 Pr 0.0077
* see notes for Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity scores
and the coding of GDP per capita
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Statistical calculations in Table 6 regarding the relationship between the passage of time 
in the post 1989 period and democracy have been included, despite the almost certainly 
spurious nature of such a correlation, in order to develop a “cut-off” measure that may be 
utilized to assess the performance of the remaining tests.   
Table 6: Democracy in Africa Over Time 1989-2010
Polity Score Total
1 2 3 4 5
Year 1989 33 6 1 1 3 44
1990 30 4 2 2 4 42
1991 12 12 1 2 7 34
1992 10 13 2 2 10 37
1993 8 14 3 3 11 39
1994 6 14 3 5 12 40
1995 5 13 5 4 12 39
1996 2 16 7 7 10 42
1997 2 17 9 5 10 43
1998 2 15 10 4 9 40
1999 2 12 11 6 9 40
2000 2 12 10 8 10 42
2001 3 10 9 9 10 41
2002 2 10 8 10 12 42
2003 2 10 9 8 12 41
2004 2 10 9 5 15 41
2005 2 10 8 5 17 42
2006 2 10 8 6 18 44
2007 2 9 8 6 19 44
2008 2 10 8 4 20 44
2009 2 8 11 5 18 44
2010 2 5 12 7 18 44
Total 135 240 154 114 266 909
Pearson Chi2 367.4542 Pr .000…
Gamma 0.3285 ASE 0.03
Kendall's tau-b 0.2843 ASE 0.026
Spearman's rho 0.3651 Pr .0000…
* see Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity scores
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Table 7 illustrates that over 90 per cent of African cases remain in the first two 
income categories throughout the entire period of investigation.  There has been 
meaningful movement between the extremely low income category of GDP per capita $2 
per day or less and the second income category, but only 3 discrete cases have broken out 
of the first two income categories in this time period. 
If the theory of linkage must be discarded in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, in 
the context of this thesis, given the absence it posits of any expectation of democratic 
outcomes, the theory of leverage must nevertheless be considered herein.  Table 8 
provides a simple test of leverage on a global scale between 1989 and 2010. 
Table 7: GDP Per Capita in Africa at 10 Year Intverals
1990 2000 2009
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
GDP 1 33 68.75 37 77.08 23 47.92
2 14 29.17 10 20.83 21 43.75
3 1 2.08 1 2.08 4 8.33
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 48 100 48 100 48 100
* see Table 1 regarding the coding of GDP per capita
** 2009 is used for the final entry because it is the last year for which
Database of Political Institutions data is available, although 2010 data
is available from World Development Indicators, I have elected to utilize
2009 for the sake of uniformity
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In Table 8 the weaker non-parametric statistical calculation for association in 
ordinal cross tabulation (gamma), as well as the location of major natural resource states 
provides tenuous confirmation of leverage theory, although the acceptability of the 
gamma statistic given its ASE of 0.06 is debatable.  It is of note however that this pattern 
is clearly driven by the authoritarian classification of 15 major natural resource producers 
in the upper left hand corner of the table, and not by the absence of authoritarian 
tendencies in states which benefit comparatively little from natural resource rents.  
Additionally, the tau and rho statistics present much weaker results. 
Table 9 provides an examination of this relationship in Africa where even the 
strength found in the gamma calculation in Table 8 above has significantly weakened.   
Table 8: Natural Resource Rents and Democracy in Impoverished States in the World 1989-2010
Polity Score Total
1 2 3 4 5
Natural Resources 1 10 0 0 0 0 10
2 5 2 3 1 0 11
3 10 21 13 17 0 61
4 163 196 152 123 253 887
Total 188 219 168 141 253 969
Pearson Chi2 80.0513 Pr 0.000...
Gamma 0.3779 ASE 0.062
Kendall's tau-b 0.138 ASE 0.024
Spearman's rho 0.1539 Pr 0.0000...
* Crosstabulation only includes states with a GDP Per Capita of $2 per day or less
** See Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity Scores
*** Natural Resources are sourced from World Development Indicators "Natural
Resource Rents as a Percentage of GDP" and this percentage is recoded into five
values: 0-25=4. 25-50=3, 50-75=2, 75+=1
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In Table 9, it is clear from the cross-tabulation that comparatively few African 
states benefit exorbitantly from natural resource rents, whilst the non-parametric 
statistical measures of association for ordinal cross tabulation are insignificant, although 
the rho statistic does not present an acceptable result.   
The institutional hypotheses discussed above are tested in the tables below, and 
while it is of note that the institutional hypothesis contending the greater association of 
parliamentary systems with democratic outcomes is broadly supported by the data for 
both the world (Tables 10 and 11) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Tables 12 and 13), upon 
examination of the data (see Tables 11 and 13) it appears to be the case that the 
correlation is driven by the strong association of parliamentary systems with democracy, 
and not through any necessary association between presidential systems and 
authoritarianism. 
Table 9: Natural Resource Rents and Democracy in Impoverished States in Africa 1989-2010
Polity Score Total
1 2 3 4 5
Natural Resources 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 2 3 1 0 6
3 2 16 3 11 0 32
4 91 150 131 72 136 580
Total 93 168 137 84 136 618
Pearson Chi2 33.5098 Pr 0.000...
Gamma 0.1357 ASE 0.09
Kendall's tau-b 0.0414 ASE 0.027
Spearman's rho 0.0464 Pr 0.2498
* See Table 8 for coding
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Table 10: Difference of Means T-Test, System and Democracy, World 1989-2010
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Group Pres. 1952 10.9667 0.154036 6.805523 10.66461 11.26879
Parl. 999 17.86587 0.113687 3.593306 17.64277 18.08896
Combined 2951 13.30227 0.124391 6.757303 13.05837 13.54617
Difference -6.89917 0.230178 -7.35049 -6.44784
t = -29.9732
H0: difference = 0 Degrees of Freedom 2949
Hyp: difference < 0 Hyp: difference = 0 Hyp: difference > 0
Pr 0.0000... Pr 0.0000... Pr 1
* Polity is recoded using the plus 10 method with transitional values
recoded as missing yielding a 0-20 scale
** system, sourced from Database of Political Institutions is recoded with
transitional values as missing (-999) and "assembly-elected president" 
as missing, yielding the dichotomous categories "presidential" and
"parliamentary"
Table 11: System and Democracy in the World 1989-2010
Polity Score Total
1 2 3 4 5
Pres. 425 349 177 212 789 1952
Parl. 1 30 48 95 825 999
Total 426 379 225 307 1614 2951
Pearson chi2 560.5588 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.4358
* see Table 1 for the coding of Polity scores
** see Table 10 regarding the coding of "presidential" and
"parliamentary"
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It is of note that the standard deviations in all results above are significant, the 
smallest one representing a first deviation around the mean of 35% of all possible scores 
on the dependent variable (Table 10 – Parliamentary), and the greatest over 65 per cent 
(Table 10 – Presidential).  While the means are statistically different, and a fairly tight 
confidence interval is generated, it should be noted that their value, as a result, is 
somewhat questionable.  It is clear on average, however, that there is a definite 
association between parliamentary systems and democratic outcomes. 
The position that parliamentary versus presidential systems generate stronger 
Table 12: Difference of Means T-Test, System and Democracy, Africa 1989-2010
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Group Pres. 716 9.77095 0.209832 5.61472 9.358989 10.18291
Parl. 99 14.11111 0.581068 5.781549 12.958 15.26422
Combined 815 10.29816 0.203431 5.807577 9.898849 10.69747
Difference -4.34016 0.604235 -5.52621 -3.15412
t = -7.1829
H0: difference = 0 Degrees of Freedom 813
Hyp: difference < 0 Hyp: difference = 0 Hyp: difference > 0
Pr 0.0000... Pr 0.0000... Pr 1
* see tables 10-11 for coding
Table 13: System and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010
PolityScore Total
1 2 3 4 5
Pres. 110 195 123 104 184 716
Parl. 0 22 19 0 58 99
Total 110 217 142 104 242 815
Pearson chi2 62.2931 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.2764
* see tables 10-11 for coding
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parties is also broadly supported by the data (Tables 14, 15, 16 and 17 below) with, on 
average, a full quintile difference in the means of party strength between presidential and 
parliamentary systems. 
 
Table 14: Difference of Means T-Test, System and Party Strength, World 1989-2010
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Group Pres. 2118 42.12333 0.790104 36.36195 40.57387 43.67279
Parl. 1265 65.58994 0.745874 26.52838 64.12665 67.05323
Combined 3383 50.89817 0.600428 34.92306 49.72093 52.0754
Difference -23.4666 1.173687 -25.7678 -21.1654
t = -19.9939
H0: difference = 0 Degrees of Freedom 3381
Hyp: difference < 0 Hyp: difference = 0 Hyp: difference > 0
Pr 0.0000... Pr 0.0000... Pr 1
* party strength is measured as the monopolization of opposition seats by
the largest opposition party
** this number is generated by the dividing the number of seats held by
the largest opposition party by the total number of opposition seats and 
multiplying the quotient by 100
*** See Tables 10-11 regarding the coding of Presidential and
Parliamentary
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Table 15: System and Party Strength, World 1989-2010
Party Strength Total
1 2 3 4 5
Pres. 715 89 376 455 483 2118
Parl. 46 35 306 384 494 1265
Total 761 124 682 839 977 3383
Pearson chi2 437.7048 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.3596
* see Table 14 regarding the generation of party strength
the largest opposition party
** party strength is ordinalized into quintiles utilizing the following
coding: 0=1, 1-25=2, 25-50=3, 50-75=4, 75-100=5
*** see Tables 10-11 regarding the coding of presidental and
parliamentary
Table 16: Difference of Means T-Test, Systemand Party Strength, Africa 1989-2010
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Group Pres. 798 42.48906 1.332887 37.65257 39.87268 45.10544
Parl. 106 68.85214 3.471171 35.73789 61.96945 75.73483
Combined 904 45.58031 1.27598 38.36438 43.07608 48.08454
Difference -26.3631 3.869942 -33.9582 -18.76794
t = -6.8123
H0: difference = 0 Degrees of Freedom 902
Hyp: difference < 0 Hyp: difference = 0 Hyp: difference > 0
Pr 0.0000... Pr 0.0000... Pr 1
* see Tables 14-15 for coding
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 Whilst the tests above are also vulnerable both to significant standard deviations, 
as well as to being predominantly driven by the results for parliamentary systems, and 
while negative cases certainly exist both in the world generally as well as in Africa 
specifically, the clear correlation between parliamentary systems and both democracy and 
strong parties is convincing enough that this thesis excludes them from its analysis, 
contending that the findings of greatest theoretical importance are those concerned with 
presidential systems.  This is the case because while it is clear that there is an association 
between democracy and parliamentary systems, there is no clear association between 
presidential systems and either outcome.  It is of note, however, that Table 17 indicates 
the strength of the relationship is weaker in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the world at large.   
Regarding the hypothesized association between electoral design and democratic 
outcomes, while there is an obvious statistical relationship between proportional 
representation and a higher polity score over other electoral systems (Tables 18-21), with 
a statistically significant and higher mean, this relationship is also much smaller in 
Africa, and it is also the case that PR electoral systems are not clustered in the 
“democracy” range in Africa as it is. 
Table 17: System and Party Strength, Africa 1989-2010
Party Strength Total
1 2 3 4 5
Pres. 286 28 120 173 191 798
Parl. 15 5 5 21 60 106
Total 301 33 125 194 251 904
Pearson chi2 56.9206 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.2509
* see Tables 12-13 for coding
 51 
 
 
In Table 18 there is nearly a 5 point, or 25 per cent difference in the average Polity Score 
of non-proportional representation systems and proportional representation systems. 
 
Table 18: Difference of Means T-Test, Proportional Representation and Democracy, World 1989-2010
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Group Other 1002 11.78543 0.203814 6.451608 11.38548 12.18538
PR 1616 16.63861 0.110389 4.437593 16.42209 16.85514
Combined 2618 14.78113 0.113356 5.79999 14.55886 15.00341
Difference -4.85319 0.213089 -5.27102 -4.43535
t = -22.7754
H0: difference = 0 Degrees of Freedom 2616
Hyp: difference < 0 Hyp: difference = 0 Hyp: difference > 0
Pr 0.0000... Pr 0.0000... Pr 1
* see Table 10 regarding the coding of Polity scores
** pr is recoded with transitional values as missing (-999)
Table 19: Proportional Representation and Democracy in the World 1989-2010
Polity Score Total
1 2 3 4 5
Other 145 178 139 132 408 1002
PR 30 107 82 139 1258 1616
Total 175 285 221 271 1666 2618
Pearson chi2 420.9684 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.4009
* see Table 1 for the coding of Polity scores
** see Table 18 regarding the coding of "proportional representation"
and "other"
 52 
 
   
Unlike in Table 18, Table 20 demonstrates only a two point difference between PR and 
non-PR systems, both of which scores are significantly undemocratic, while Cramer’s phi 
statistic in Table 21 has nearly been halved from that in Table 19. 
Pertaining to political parties, this thesis contends that because both theories 
ultimately posit negative outcomes, namely that proportional representation systems 
spread seats too widely amongst too many (minor) parties, and that first-past-the-post 
systems make it too difficult for many parties to get a foothold in the system, both 
extremes represent a negative outcome for non-incumbent parties, as both hegemonic 
party systems (eased by first past the post systems) and absurdly plural systems (eased by 
Table 20: Difference of Means T-Test, Proportional Representation and Democracy, Africa 1989-2010
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Group Other 383 11.27154 0.282108 5.520964 10.71686 11.82622
PR 267 13.03745 0.299804 4.898836 12.44716 13.62774
Combined 650 11.99692 0.209516 5.34164 11.58551 12.40833
Difference -1.76591 0.420514 -2.59165 -0.94018
t = -4.1994
H0: difference = 0 Degrees of Freedom 648
Hyp: difference < 0 Hyp: difference = 0 Hyp: difference > 0
Pr 0.0000... Pr 0.0000... Pr 1
* see Tables 18-19 for coding
Table 21: Proportional Representation and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010
Polity Score Total
1 2 3 4 5
Other 20 107 73 55 128 383
PR 0 47 62 31 127 267
Total 20 154 135 86 255 650
Pearson chi2 31.2688 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.2193
* see Tables 18-19 for coding
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proportional representation) can be shown to have a negative impact on democracy.  In 
addition, the correlations between a dummy independent variable “proportional 
representation” and party strength are unreliable in the same sense as those examined 
throughout this section, perhaps even more so (Tables 22-25).  
 
 
As Table 22 illustrate, mean party strength of the most significant opposition party in the 
global dataset based on electoral system only differs by approximately two points, and 
the confidence intervals overlap.  Table 23 illustrates that all electoral systems modally 
tend toward democracy, but both have significant numbers of non-democratic cases. 
Table 22: Difference of Means T-Test, Electoral System and Party Strength, World 1989-2010
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Group Other 1224 57.18736 1.043756 36.51653 55.13961 59.23511
PR 1768 59.70378 0.612625 25.75939 58.50224 60.90533
Combined 2992 58.67434 0.560145 30.63948 57.57603 59.77264
Difference -2.51643 1.13854 -4.74883 -0.28402
t = -2.2102
H0: difference = 0 Degrees of Freedom 2990
Hyp: difference < 0 Hyp: difference = 0 Hyp: difference > 0
Pr 0.0136 Pr 0.0272 Pr 0.9864
*See Table 14 regarding the coding of party strength
** See Table 18 regrading the coding of PR and Other
Table 23: Electoral System and Party Strength, World 1989-2010
Party Strength Total
1 2 3 4 5
Other 205 90 213 245 471 1224
PR 96 46 493 608 525 1768
Total 301 136 706 853 996 2992
Pearson chi2 230.8835 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.2777
* see Table 14 regarding the coding of party strength
** see Table 18 regarding the coding of PR
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In Table 24 it is made evident that the mean strength of the most significant 
opposition parties in Africa, unlike global results, is significantly higher.  However, in 
Table 25 it is evident that the modal party strength of major opposition parties in non PR 
electoral systems is clustered at the high end, with over 50 per cent of observations in the 
top two ranges. In this regard, this thesis will not engage the relationship between 
electoral systems and party strength or democracy where the positive value of any 
observed correlation between electoral system and both democracy and party strength is 
debatable. 
Table 24: Difference of Means T-Test, Electoral System and Party Strength, Africa 1989-2010
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Group Other 400 51.81183 1.779453 35.58906 48.31355 55.3101
PR 291 64.09801 1.696786 28.945 60.75844 67.43759
Combined 691 56.98589 1.273912 33.48717 54.48469 59.4871
Difference -12.2862 2.539218 -17.2717 -7.30065
t = -4.8386
H0: difference = 0 Degrees of Freedom 689
Hyp: difference < 0 Hyp: difference = 0 Hyp: difference > 0
Pr 0.0000... Pr 0.0000... Pr 1
*See Table 14 regarding the coding of party strength
** See Table 18 regrading the coding of PR and Other
Table 25: Electoral System and Party Strength, Africa 1989-2010
Party Strength Total
1 2 3 4 5
Other 86 24 59 112 119 400
PR 15 9 77 75 115 291
Total 101 33 136 187 234 691
Pearson chi2 50.5649 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.2705
* see Table 14 regarding the coding of party strength
** see Table 18 regarding the coding of PR
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Tables 26 and 27 below offer a preliminary confirmation of the position that 
strong opposition parties are correlated with democratization in hybrid regimes with 
presidential systems, and one that passes the critical score set in Table 6 above. 
 
Table26: Opposition Strength and Democracy in the World 1989-2010 in Presidential Systems
Polity Score Totals
Opposition Strength 1 2 3 4 5
0% 343 136 26 53 38 596
1-25% 20 23 3 10 32 88
25-50% 27 59 43 42 198 369
50-75% 10 72 52 58 247 439
75-100% 25 59 53 49 274 460
Totals 425 349 177 212 789 1952
Pearson's chi2 826.1008 Pr 0.000...
Gamma 0.5655 ASE 0.019
Kendall's tau-b 0.4458 ASE 0.016
Spearman's rho 0.537 Pr 0.0000...
* See Table 1 Regarding the generation of Polity scores
** Where opposition strength is measured as the number of seats held
by the largest opposition party divided by the total number of seats held
by the opposition, and the quotient is multiplied by 100
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Tables 26 and 27 both present strong non-parametric statistical measures of ordinal 
association.  In Table 26 both gamma and rho exceed 0.5, whilst in Table 27, and 
consistent with the results at large, the results for Africa are slightly weaker with a rho 
value of 0.49 and a tau of 0.41.  Upon examination of tables 26-27 it is clear that the 
lowest, or most liberal, point at which the pattern seems to shift in confirmation of the 
hypothesis that opposition strength may be correlated with democracy is where a 
predominant opposition party monopolizes 25 per cent or more of the opposition seats.  
In line with this observation, and with the intent of developing a minimal cut-off that may 
be used in qualitative assessments, tables 28 and 29 below test the strength of this 
relationship using 25% monopolization as a dichotomous cut-off. 
Table 27: Opposition Strength and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010 in Presidential Systems
Polity Score Totals
Opposition Strength 1 2 3 4 5
0% 105 68 18 27 10 228
1-25% 0 14 2 0 12 28
25-50% 0 29 35 17 37 118
50-75% 5 41 45 29 45 165
75-100% 0 43 23 31 80 177
Totals 110 195 123 104 184 716
Pearson's chi2 326.8803 Pr 0.000...
Gamma 0.5131 ASE 0.033
Kendall's tau-b 0.4087 ASE 0.027
Spearman's rho 0.4912 Pr 0.0000...
* See Table 1 Regarding the generation of Polity scores
** See Table 26 regarding the generation of opposition strength
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Both Tables 28 and 29 present results which indicate that 25 per cent opposition 
monopolization may be used as the basis of a minimal theoretic criteria.  With Cramer’s 
phi values of 0.623 and 0.5838 respectively, it may be argued that an important amount 
of variation is explained by the monopolization of at least 25 per cent of opposition seats 
by a major opposition party.  While higher thresholds would likely yield stronger results, 
seeking the most liberal threshold likely has greater pragmatic utility in terms of the 
investigation of hybrid regimes. 
Table 28: Opposition Strength and Democracy in the World 1989-2010 in
Presidential Systems where the Leading Opposition Party is able to Monopolize
at least 25% of Opposition Seats
Polity Score Totals
Opposition Strength 1 2 3 4 5
< 25 363 159 29 63 70 684
> 25 62 190 148 149 719 1268
Totals 425 349 177 212 789 1952
Pearson's chi2 757.7725 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.623
* See Table 1 for the generation of Polity scores
** See Table 26 for the generation of opposition strength scores
Table 29: Opposition Strength and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010 in Presidential
Systems where the Leading Opposition Party is able ot Monopolize at least 25%
of Opposition Seats
Polity Score Totals
Opposition Strength 1 2 3 4 5
< 25 105 82 20 27 22 256
> 25 5 113 103 77 162 460
Totals 110 195 123 104 184 716
Pearson's chi2 244.0979 Pr 0.000...
Cramer's phi 0.5838
* See Table 1 for the generation of Polity scores
** See Table 26 for the generation of opposition strength scores
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 It would be at this point in the analysis where it would be natural to pursue a more 
complex statistical analysis of the relationship made discrete in the analysis above.  The 
most obvious path to pursue at this point would be some form of longitudinal analysis 
which attempts to increase the validity of the argument for the presence of a causal link 
between opposition strength and democracy over time.  There may be several concerns 
with pursuing such a path, predominantly the caution that certain methodologists in 
political science would urge on those seeking to engage in longitudinal statistics without 
careful scrutiny of their data.135  The reservations with engaging longitudinal analysis lie 
primarily in the instability of the universe of cases over time, where the number of 
observations satisfying the criteria of inclusion almost triples across the period of 
analysis, if anything documenting the so called “rise of competitive authoritarianism” 
after the Cold War.136  In addition to the instability of the universe of cases, restricting 
the analysis to the post-1989 years means that the convention of having 30 longitudinal 
observations for a given unit cannot be satisfied.137  Finally, this thesis does not expect a 
linear relationship to exist between opposition strength and democracy, but a relationship 
which hinges on a critical mass of the independent variable, and in relation to a 
dependent variable which possesses a defined and achievable ceiling, i.e. democracy.  
Given that the interest is, in fact, in those cases that enter this universe during the 
period of analysis from authoritarian backgrounds, it is not clear that enough time has 
elapsed to meaningfully statistically analyse variation herein.  It is the position of this 
these that such investigation at this stage should likely take the form of causal process 
                                                          
135 See, for example: Kellstedt and Whitten 2009, 233-243 
136 It is normally the opposite issue of attrition that must be dealt with in longitudinal studies, and which is 
therefore discussed widely in the literature, but it may be inferred the somewhat novel problem of 
acquisition bears the same issue. 
137 Frees 2004, 7 
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tracing, although this must be left this to future research.  Qualification being noted, both 
the number of units included in the analysis, as well as the possibility that a dynamic and 
shared pattern is present amongst them, may satisfy the minimal requirements for a 
longitudinal investigation.138 Table 30 presents this longitudinal data on movement 
within African presidential regimes with prominent opposition parties monopolizing 25 
per cent or more of opposition seats at some point across this period.  Consistent with the 
orientation of this thesis as a whole, this information in the most parsimonious manner 
could conceivable.   
                                                          
138 See, for example: Ibidem 
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Table 30 demonstrates significant variation in central tendency over time in presidential 
regimes with opposition parties capable of monopolizing at least 25 per cent of the non-
incumbent vote.  The scope of variation ranges from a low of 9, midway between a pure 
autocracy and a pure democracy, between the 3rd and 5th years of strong opposition 
presence, consistent with a dive in score in the period that would normally constitute the 
second electoral period in which the strong party was participating, to a high of 16 at 
years 17 and 18.  The general pattern of the central tendency reported is one of more or 
less progressive democratization over time.  In years 19 and above it is of note that 
Table 30: Central Tendency Variation in Polity Scores Across
Time Based on Distance from "Year Zero" as 1st Year in
which an Opposition Party Monopolizes at least 25% of
Opposition Seats in an African Presidential Regime between
1989 and 2010
median n
Year 0 10.5 35
Year 1 12 34
Year 2 12 32
Year 3 9 32
Year 4 9 28
Year 5 9 29
Year 6 10 26
Year 7 14 26
Year 8 11 27
Year 9 14 26
Year 10 15 26
Year 11 14 27
Year 12 15 29
Year 13 15.5 26
Year 14 15 24
Year 15 15 21
Year 16 13 17
Year 17 16 11
Year 18 16 7
Year 19 14.5 4
Year 20 10.5 2
Year 21 10.5 2
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median Polity scores drop, and this is in relation to the extremely small number of cases 
meeting the criteria, one with a high Polity score, and one with a low Polity score. 
Of 34 Sub-Saharan African states observed in the period 1989-2010 with 
presidential systems and possessing a major opposition party capable of monopolizing at 
least 25% of opposition seats, 18 have experienced positive change and 10 have remained 
static, or returned to their original categorization after a brief aberration.139  Among the 
first 18 states, six express positive variation without achieving full democratic status, and 
amongst those six is Uganda.  The remaining twelve states have entered as hybrid 
regimes and acquired Polity scores which would suggest they have become full 
democracies, or have moved to within a point of such a score.  Regarding the 10 neutral 
outcome states, eight have entered and remained competitive authoritarian regimes, and 
two have scores which would indicate they are democracies.  Amongst those that have 
entered and remained competitive authoritarian is the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(although no Polity Score is available according to the coding).  Finally, six states 
included have met the parameters for inclusion in this panel but have deteriorated, three 
of which appear to constitute “democratic breakdowns” given their initial high scores.  
This leaves only three negative cases in direct contradiction of the theory herein, of 
which one is Rwanda. 
 In conclusion, when data is truncated to exclude the contamination of the Cold 
War on theories which are not seeking to explain its influence, and when hybrid regimes 
are taken as the starting point instead of authoritarian regimes, there appears to be a 
significant shift in the variables which bear explanatory power on democratic outcomes.  
It is the conclusion of this thesis, based on the data above, that extant and broadly 
                                                          
139 For the data corresponding to the discussion in this paragraph, please see the appendix 
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accepted theories of democratization, whilst they may certainly explain movement 
toward democracy from authoritarian regimes, nevertheless lose some explanatory power 
whence those regimes have introduced minimal democratic reforms.  Toward democracy 
movement in hybrid regimes seem to be best explained by opposition strength.  The 
intervening nature of opposition strength is inferred by the fact that those theories 
discarded within the parameters of this analysis do, quite certainly, bear explanatory 
power on democratic outcomes within their own parameters, i.e. on movement from 
authoritarianism to democracy, inclusive of the Cold War years. 
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Chapter 6: Case Presentation 
 Chapter 6 will present, through multiple cases, the data concerning opposition 
strength and financing; structural inheritance; violence in the party system; the 
proliferation of independents, small parties and identity based parties; and formal and 
informal institutional constraints on and in the party system, this latter variable which has 
not been iterated prior to the presentation of case data, but shall be delimited by the data 
below.  Whilst it is clear that all of these variables could be quantified, such 
quantifications are either presently not available for secondary analysis, or are too crude 
for the purposes of this analysis.  The casework below therefore provides detailed 
summations of the Ugandan, DRC and Rwandan cases, whilst analysis is reserved for the 
following chapter. 
The Case of Uganda 
 From independence in 1962 Ugandan politics has gone through several important 
transitions.  Uganda gained independence as a democracy, and more or less remained one 
until the Amin dictatorship commencing in 1971, with several important and 
institutionalized political parties, namely: the Democratic Party, the Uganda People’s 
Congress, and Kabaka Yekka, amongst others.  These parties reflected politicized 
cleavages in Ugandan society at independence, primarily cleavages related to religion and 
identity.  By the 1970s democracy had been definitively interrupted by the dictatorship of 
Idi Amin (1971-1979), followed by the second presidency of Milton Obote (Obote II – 
1980-1985), highly contested on its democratic credentials, and finally the short military 
junta of the Okello brothers (1985-1986) in expectation of NRM victory.  In 1986 the 
current president, Yoweri Museveni, and his National Resistance Movement/Army 
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(hereinafter NRM, inclusive of future nomenclatural permutations) took power by force, 
and have remained in government since.  It is of note that Museveni was a political 
refugee, after initially being dismissed from his post as Minister of Defense in 1979, and 
before he subsequently formed the National Resistance Movement in 1981.140 
 On coming to power the NRM instituted a “no-party democracy” system which 
from 1986 banned the activities and contestation of political parties,141 and required that 
only NRM members sit in whatever institution served as the effective legislature; 
although all citizens of Uganda were technically members of the Movement.  This system 
was institutionalized for the nominal purposes of preventing uncompromising political 
polarization at the hands of ethnically based parties,142 although the NRM has been 
heavily identified with southerners as a meta-identity,143 and was based in an anti-party 
and individual merit ideology expressed by comparatively loose organization more or 
less dependent on the personage of its leader and his patronage capacity.144  Whilst the 
no-party years did not ban the existence of political parties, it allowed them only central 
headquarters, and required them to enter parliament under the NRM banner.  This was 
affected via the conceptualization of the NRM as a “home” to all other organizations, 
parties and tendencies,145 and the co-optation of Members of Parliament and local 
councilors into the NRM, ultimately resulting in the conflation of the NRM with state 
structure.146  This destabilized the old political parties in a number of ways, dividing 
them as to whether or not they should completely boycott Ugandan politics; undeniably 
                                                          
140 Chretien 2003, 297 
141 Legal Notice No. 1/1986, as cited in: Carbone 2008, 78 
142 Carbone 2008, 5, 78 
143 Ibidem 64 
144 Ibidem 91 
145 Ibidem 
146 Ibidem 99 
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associating those who elected integration with the NRM with the incumbent regime and, 
therefore, bringing their credentials as opposition parties into question; and severely 
weakening their ability to maintain autonomous organizations in the country in terms of 
funding, membership and proselytizing.147   In addition, the NRM objectives of 
remedying certain salient cleavages in Ugandan political society, such as identity and 
religion, may have served to undermine the very bases of those old political parties, 
insofar as Democratic Party support was based in Catholic non-Bugandans, Uganda 
People’s Congress support was based in Protestant non-Bugandans, and Buganda heavily 
supported the (short lived) Kabaka Yekka party;148 whilst it simultaneously restricted the 
ability of these parties to adapt to new circumstances.   
 During the course of NRM rule in Uganda democratic reforms have slowly been 
introduced in order to bring the country back from a “no-party democracy” to a multi-
party political system.  Although originally rejected by the electorate in a referendum in 
2000, which elected to retain the no-party system for at least a further five years with a 91 
per cent majority,149 this movement gathered momentum most notably from the 2001 
elections in the hopes of preventing the removal of presidential term limits and, for some, 
remaining true the “broad-base” no-party system.150  It was at these elections that the 
basis of what has become the dominant opposition party emerged in the form of the 
Parliamentary Advocacy Forum, amongst other groups from within the NRM.151   
Uganda entered a new period of official multipartyism in July 2005 after a 
referendum was held in expectation of elections in 2006, which referendum passed with a 
                                                          
147 For a summary of the historic political parties during the no-party years see: Ibidem 109-136. 
148 Ibidem 16, 21.  Chretien 2003, 293-296 
149 Carbone 2008, 3; Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 4 
150 Rubongoya 2007, 168 
151 Ibidem 
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92 per cent endorsement; although it was ironically boycotted by the “opposition” due to 
the inclusion of a clause removing presidential term limits at the same time as a positive 
vote would legalize multiparty politics.152  However, it has not been the old political 
parties that have played the substantive role of opposition, but the political organization 
which has come to be known as the Forum for Democratic Change (hereinafter FDC) 
under the leadership of Kizza Besigye.  Besigye was an early member of the NRM from 
the war days153 who, on believing or stating to believe that the NRM had become 
dishonest, opportunistic and undemocratic,154 wrote an open letter in 1999 accusing the 
government of corruption, tribalism and a democratic deficit,155 and decided that he 
would challenge the presidency of Museveni in 2001 (in which he won 26 per cent of the 
vote),156 and from 2006 also the legislative dominance of the NRM.  
Uganda 2006 Elections Summary 
  PARTY: 
 
SEATS: 
   
      NRM 
 
205 (14 indirect) 
  FDC 
 
37 
   
      Total Opposition 92 
   
      Total seats in legislature 
  
308 
Total elected seats by universal franchise 283 
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party 40.22 
 
In the 2006 elections, the first multiparty elections since the controversial 
elections in 1980 which returned Milton Obote and ultimately resulted in the NRM 
                                                          
152 Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 11; Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 4; Human Rights Watch 2009, 6 
153 Bisegye is a physician who served as a Colonel and personal physician to Museveni.  See, for example: 
Tripp 2010, 29 
154 Tripp 2010, 29 
155 Ibidem 65-66 
156 Ibidem 66 
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rebellion,157 the incumbent Museveni secured 59 per cent of the vote, whilst Besigye 
garnered 37 per cent.158  The NRM won 205 seats and the FDC 37159 in a 308 member 
unicameral parliament of which 214 members were directly elected from constituencies 
in a first past the post electoral system, 69 from the district level reserved for women, and 
the remaining seats elected from special interest groups by electoral colleges.160  This 
means that the FDC was able to monopolize 40.22 per cent of the opposition (accounting 
for the fact that 14 incumbent seats were filled indirectly), while independents with 36 
(37 with one indirect seat) accounted for 39.13 per cent of the non-incumbent vote, and 
the FDC accounted for 66.07 per cent of the non-incumbent vote that went to political 
parties. 
The official campaign period for the 2006 elections was limited to 61 days due to 
a delay in establishing the legal framework for the elections.161  This campaign period 
was effectively reduced for the main opposition candidate, Kizza Bisegye, in that he was 
charged with numerous crimes within three weeks of his return to Uganda to contest the 
elections, including treason and rape of which he was acquitted in 2010 and 2006 
respectively, although he was forced to attend 27 judicial hearings within the already 
brief campaign period.162  It has been noted that the NRM was able to bring their vastly 
superior resources to bear on a campaign in which they dominated in all areas.163  That 
being said there is an otherwise egalitarian electoral funding scheme by which all 
presidential candidates are entitled to 20 million Ugandan Shillings, approximately 8200 
                                                          
157 See for example the summary in: Commonwealth Secretariat 2011,: 3-4 
158 Ibidem 4; Izama 2011, 64 
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160 Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 16, 18 
161 Ibidem 23 
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CAD, as well as a vehicle and security.164  In the 2006 elections this funding scheme was 
not extended to political parties, with the effect of financially barring all but the 
incumbent from competing in every constituency,165 exacerbated by the fact that there are 
no legal limits on campaign expenditure.166  In addition, incidents of bribery were widely 
reported, although the practice was not restricted to any one party.167  Similarly, 
complaints regarding violence, intimidation and harassment were lodged against the 
incumbent and opposition alike.168  It is clear, however, that in the means of both bribery 
as well as violence, the incumbent possesses superior resources.  Regarding media, print 
media was judged as effectively balanced whilst electronic media was regarded as more 
biased in its coverage of the contenders.169  Of note in this regard are that daily 
newspapers have combined sales of approximately 100,000 newspapers sold, and an 
estimated daily readership of approximately 1.5 million, or 5 per cent of the population, 
whilst approximately 64 per cent of the population rely on electronic media and 34 per 
cent on word of mouth.170  The elections themselves were regarded as an accurate 
reflection of the choice of the people, albeit with notable issues,171 including overarching 
points such as the lack of a level playing field, the conflation of the NRM with the state 
apparatus, and the presence of considerable violence and manipulation such as murder, 
bribery, threats, intimidation, vote rigging, and the selective prosecution of the law to the 
disadvantage of opposition parties.172  Such inconsistencies have been confirmed by the 
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Ugandan Supreme Court without causing them to question the outcome of the elections 
themselves.173 
By the 2006 elections the primary policy platform of the FDC was constituted by 
the desire to rally prodemocracy forces against Museveni and the NRM, uphold the 
presidential term limit, build strong and professional security agencies, eliminate 
militaristic motivations from foreign policy, and eliminate corruption and political 
patronage.174 
Uganda 2011 Elections Summary 
  PARTY: 
 
SEATS: 
   
      NRM 
 
263 (13 indirect) 
  IPC 
 
36 
   
      Total Opposition 100 
   
      Total seats in legislature 
  
375 
Total elected seats by universal franchise 350 
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party 36 
 
In the 2011 elections the incumbent Museveni secured 68 per cent of the 
presidential vote, and the NRM 263 legislative seats.  Besigye, now at the head of the so-
called Inter-Party Cooperation, secured 26 per cent of the vote and the FDC secured 34 
legislative seats.  In this latest election the Democratic Party under Norbert Mao secured 
1.86 per cent of the presidential vote and 11 seats, whilst the Uganda People’s Congress 
under Olara Otunnu garnered 1.58 per cent of the presidential vote and 9 seats,175 both of 
which parties were originally to contest under Besigye and the IPC banner.176  The size of 
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the legislature was increased for 2011, comprised of 375 members of which 238 are 
elected from single member constituencies and 112 from district seats reserved for 
women in a first past the post system.177  25 seats remain reserved for election from 
electoral colleges for special interest groups.178  This means that in 2011 the FDC secured 
a 34 per cent monopolization of the opposition, and if IPC members are included a 36 per 
cent monopolization (accounting for the one seat each taken by the Conservative Party 
and the Justice Forum, as well as for the fact that 13 of the NRM seats are indirectly 
filled, leaving 250 elected from constituencies and districts).  This is a drop of four to six 
per cent from 2006.  Independent candidates secured 41 per cent of the non-incumbent 
vote with 41 seats (43 including indirectly filled seats), and the IPC monopolized 61.02 
per cent of the non-incumbent vote that went to political parties, a decrease of 5 per cent 
from the FDC’s showing in 2006.  It is of note that the Democratic Party and Uganda 
People’s Congress, who defected from the IPC, are the only other parties in the 
legislature.  The stronger showing of the incumbent in 2011 was even more generalized, 
with the average winning margin of FDC candidates who were elected falling from 
around 30 per cent to around 15 per cent.179   
The NRM campaigned primarily on economic growth, the maintenance of peace, 
zero-tolerance for corruption, and improvement or expansion of various public goods.180  
Most of the other parties, in an apparent attempt to capture the important Buganda vote, 
included a promise of federalism in their campaigns.181  The IPC in particular 
campaigned on “change,” as well as, like the incumbent, zero-tolerance for corruption 
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and the improvement or expansion of various public goods.182 
Similar to 2006, it has been suggested that the NRM utilized its effective 
conflation with the state apparatus to utilize state resources for the purposes of 
campaigning.183  This has included the suspicion that a supplementary election budget of 
600 billion Ugandan Shillings may have been used for campaign purposes,184 and 
continued reports that candidates have effectively engaged in the illegal bribery of 
electors.185  Consistent with the above, as well as with monitoring of the 2006 elections, 
the main concerns of the Commonwealth Observer Group centered around the use of 
money in the campaign, the NRM’s abuse of incumbency, and the lack of a level playing 
field between contesting parties.186  Differing from 2006 is the legal extension of the state 
funding scheme to include political parties, however this funding was not disbursed, and 
whilst presidential candidates did receive the same 20 million Ugandan Shilling 
amount.187  Regarding international donors, it is known that stakeholders in the Ugandan 
elections such as the electoral commission, political parties, elections observers, et cetera 
were expected to receive multimillion dollar funding packages from USAID as well as 
from an elections fund managed by the Danish Development Agency.188  The media 
landscape has significantly changed from the 2006 elections with more television and 
radio stations, an exponential increase in internet users (3.5 million in 2010 versus less 
than 350,000 in 2006), 10.3 million mobile phone subscribers, and static estimates of 
                                                          
182 Ibidem 21 
183 See, for example: Ibidem 14-15 
184 Ibidem 15 
185 Ibidem 15, 20 
186 Ibidem 19 
187 Ibidem 19-20 
188 Human Rights Watch 2009, 26 
 72 
newspaper readership which remained at approximately 1.5 million.189  The largest, and 
state-owned, television station, Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, gave an overwhelming 
90 per cent of electoral coverage to the incumbent, with the remaining 10 per cent 
allotted to coverage of opposition parties being largely negative in nature.190  Similarly, 
monitoring of radio coverage indicated that discussion of the incumbent was positive, 
whilst coverage of the opposition was largely either neutral or negative in nature.191  That 
being said, such skews in media coverage are believed to be more the result of self-
censorship than any delimited restrictions,192 although this position is debatable in the 
context of UBC. 
Every Ugandan is legally free to found a political party, excepting that is illegal to 
do so on an ethnic or religious basis,193 and all parties are required by law to be internally 
democratic.194  The parameters of legal and illegal electoral practices are defined in the 
Presidential Elections Act, the Parliamentary Elections Act, and the Electoral 
Commissions Act.195   
Despite the dominant position of the FDC vis-à-vis the opposition, the NRM 
remains dominant in the party system generally.  This dominance does not appear to 
hinge on its competitive advantage in the distribution of patronage, despite allegations,196 
insofar as it has been noted it is not comprised of the wealthiest persons in the state, and 
those politicians who are counted amongst the most wealthy typically acquired their 
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economic status prior to coming into government.197  Uganda has, in fact, been 
characterized as possessing a large and expanding entrepreneurial class which,198 insofar 
as this class possesses any autonomy, should serve to equalize the domestic funding 
opportunities of political parties, ceterus paribus.  Albeit, the true autonomy of this class 
has been questioned in terms of the state’s role as the most significant purchaser.199  
Additionally, it has been noted that the NRM has (historically) received its funding 
directly from the national budget, despite the fact that state funding has been effectively 
denied other political parties,200 and that during the no-party years political parties were 
forbidden from receiving private contributions, whilst the NRM itself imposed no such 
restriction on itself.201  Far from being a truly monopolistic party, rather, it has been 
posited that the dominance of the NRM in Uganda has rested primarily in the absence of 
a serious competitor and its advantageous conflation with the state apparatus.202  
The FDC was carved out of the no-party regime by Bisegye, who was a 
participant in that regime.  As such, Bisegye was able to build his support around persons 
who were already serving in government, both NRM dissenters, as well as politicians 
whose original loyalties lay with the old political parties.203  The basis of the FDC was 
three NRM splinter groups which merged in 2004: Parliamentary Advocacy Forum, 
Reform Agenda (Besigye’s ticket in the 2001 presidential elections), and Democratic 
Forum,204 and its dominant position in the opposition has been enabled by the confluence 
of dissent from within the regime, both professional politicians and military brass, and 
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weakness in the historic political parties.205  Thusly Besigye was able not only to enter 
the fray with an advantage over his non-incumbent competitors, but also to 
simultaneously weaken the incumbent and enter electoral contestation with an existing 
base of support in the form of serving politicians who were already secure in their 
constituencies. 
Besigye and the FDC’s privileged beginnings have not blessed them with the 
absence of repression.  Its members, including Besigye, have variously been arrested or 
forced into exile.  Besigye himself, amongst other opposition supporters, was physically 
attacked in June 2010 by a group known as the kiboko (stick) squad, a group allegedly 
supported by the state.206  Protests against the composition of the electoral commission in 
the same year were met with police brutality,207 and Besigye was arrested a number of 
times throughout 2011 and faced “preventative detention” for participation in the ongoing 
“walk to work” protests.208  It would seem, therefore, that the value of carving an 
opposition out of the governing party in regimes such as that in Uganda does not lie in 
freedom from oppression.   
Whether citizens vote for the FDC on the basis of its platform or in protest of the 
incumbent, these votes are precarious in the context of an incumbent with a stable hold 
on power willing and able to campaign for those votes it finds itself losing.  This is 
evident in the context of the latest elections regarding incumbent success in the north, a 
longtime bastion of opposition to NRM rule, and previously dominated by the FDC.209  
On finally taking action to better the conditions of northerners in the same way it has 
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done so for the rest of the country, both in terms of peace as well as economic 
development, the incumbent NRM has made significant inroads with northern voters.210  
It would seem that if oppositions are to remain perpetually out of power, they can be 
undermined by incumbents willing to discern why they are receiving any support at all.  
And as Magaloni has noted, citizens may rally in support of autocrats who can bring 
economic growth, and despise those who cannot.211 
This early support for the FDC in the north, and now support for the incumbent, 
would suggest that the salience of ethnicity as a vehicle for voter preference is weaker 
than earlier scholars would have expected.  Neither Bisegye nor Museveni are 
northerners, but northerners have voted for one and then the other despite the presence 
amongst their other choices of a candidate representing the region.212 
Thirdly, whilst the FDC has unquestionably been the dominant non-incumbent 
party, it does not clearly dominate the non-incumbent vote.  Almost as many votes as go 
to the FDC go to independent candidates.  Additionally, there has been continued internal 
dissent from within the incumbent NRM party by a group of 38 parliamentarians who 
form a sort of “internal opposition” equal in strength to the FDC.213  The phenomenon of 
independent candidates is enabled by two additional and important factors in Ugandan 
politics: firstly, that the NRM has been the only party capable of fielding candidates in all 
215 constituencies, whereas the FDC fielded candidates in 127 in 2006, the UPC 74, and 
the DP 68;214 and, secondly, that experienced politicians from the individual merit years 
who have lost their party ticket often run as independents against the new NRM 
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candidates,215 and even on pro-NRM platforms.216 
The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 The Democratic Republic of Congo (hereinafter, and regardless of the various 
names the state has gone by throughout its history, DRC) gained independence in 1960 
from Belgium as a democratic state.  Parties had only a short period prior to 
independence to form, and there were clear machinations on the part of foreign powers, 
firstly, to retain privileged access to the DRC’s rich resources, expressed through the 
attempt at secession by Katanga province, and secondly to prevent a possible alliance of 
the Congolese state with the Soviets, expressed through the assassination of 
independence leader and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the installation and 
support of Mobutu as dictator.  Mobutu’s dictatorship in the DRC (renamed Zaire during 
the majority of his rule) lasted from the 1960s until 1997 when he was finally removed 
from power by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques  pour la Libération du Congo-
Zaire military alliance (hereinafter AFDL) led by Laurent Désiré Kabila and backed by a 
number of African states.  Laurent Désiré Kabila’s rule was also dictatorial, and almost 
immediately challenged by a second wave of rebellions backed by some of the very states 
which brought him to power.  This second conflict resulted in the assassination of 
Laurent Désiré Kabila, the succession of his son Joseph Kabila to power, and an 
internationally brokered peace deal, the Sun City Accord signed on 19th April 2002, 
guaranteeing democratic elections and a new constitution at the end of a period of 
transitional government.217  The incumbent party under Joseph Kabila is the Parti du 
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Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD), although he officially runs as an 
independent. 
 During this broad period of political history in the DRC there have been two 
prominent opposition political parties: the Union pour Démocratie et le Progrès Social 
(hereinafter UDPS) of Etienne Tshisekedi, and the Mouvement de Libération du Congo 
(hereinafter MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba. 
 The MLC was a rebel organization, formed on 30th June 1999 in Equateur 
Province,218 backed by Museveni’s Uganda shortly after the successful rebellion which 
brought Laurent Désiré Kabila’s AFDL to power (itself backed by Uganda).  As one of 
the prominent parties to the conflict, the MLC was granted a significant position in the 
transitional government generated via brokered peace, and Jean-Pierre Bemba 
participated in this government as one of several vice-presidents.  Once in government 
the MLC appeared to more or less commit to democratic politics and, once made the 
major opposition party by the first post-Mobutu democratic mandate, to opposition 
politics, although with aberrations consistent with their past as a rebel organization.   
 Several factors appear to have contributed to the rise and position of the MLC, 
namely: its disproportionate access to foreign and private domestic funding; its ability to 
participate in government prior to elections as a high profile organization; the non-
monetary resources its leader was personally able to provide it; and the electoral boycott 
of the UDPS. 
 In terms of funding, as stated, the MLC was backed by Museveni’s Uganda as a 
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rebel organization.219  This initial backing must certainly have provided it with a financial 
stability not comparable with other opposition political parties, id est to be a military 
organization backed by a comparatively wealthy foreign state.  In addition, Jean-Pierre 
Bemba himself was an extremely wealthy man, the inheritor of a fortune generated by his 
father through a privileged relationship both to the dictator Mobutu,220 as well as to 
Laurent Désiré Kabila.  These funds meant that, unlike many opposition parties in Africa, 
Bemba’s MLC was able to meaningfully and effectively campaign against the incumbent 
government. 
Also dissimilar from the typical circumstances of new opposition parties was the 
ability of the rebel MLC organization to spend a period of time in government as a 
distinct organization prior to elections, with their leader serving as vice-president.221  
This, without doubt, provided MLC politicians with professional experience, and their 
leader as well as their organization generally with a high profile in politics, as opposed to 
in civil war.  Given the unique position of being a party to a peace accord with a 
significant number of men-at-arms remaining in his private service, Bemba could also 
more or less afford to be critical of government with impunity and without fear of 
repression.  The clear benefit of this position is that Bemba did not have to construct a 
party from nothing and campaign from the political periphery, but was able to enter 
government in force based on a peace accord, and campaign from that privileged 
position. 
 In addition to personal wealth and the advantage of campaigning from an already 
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strong position in government, Bemba was able to bring non-monetary resources to the 
MLC as a political organization, the most important of which was probably media access.  
As noted above Bemba was disproportionately wealthy given the virtual empire inherited 
from his father, and a meaningful part of this empire was in media.  Bemba was the 
owner of television and radio stations, such as Canal Congo Television (CCTV), Radio 
Liberte, and Canal Kin Television.222  The advantage provided by these assets are 
obvious, repression in undemocratic African regimes is almost certainly aided by 
incumbent ownership, control or repression of the media.  Whilst it has been noted that 
there was hardly neutral media coverage of the 2006 elections, a majority of outlets were 
owned by presidential candidates with none holding a monopoly and, therefore, de facto 
broad coverage was affected, albeit not without conflict and deaths.223  And although 
there were significant attempts on the part of the incumbent to suppress his media 
outlets,224 Bemba and the MLC clearly had access to unrestricted and positive media 
coverage which could not be censored by the incumbent. 
 Working against the efficacy of the opposition during the first post-war 
democratic mandate was the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba by the International Criminal 
Court in May 2008.225  Congolese law, as of 4th December 2007, guarantees senior 
ministerial rank to the spokesperson of the opposition, but the MLC refused to nominate 
anyone to this position in order to retain it for Bemba should he have returned.226 
 Finally, Bemba and the MLC were certainly able to benefit from the electoral 
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boycott of the UDPS in the first post-conflict elections,227 although it was reported that 
he had been attempting to secure what would have been a very important alliance with 
the UDPS in the lead up to those elections.228  The UDPS was expected to be a strong 
competitor, and some have hypothesized that the position of the MLC in the first 
democratic mandate was no more than a substitution for the missing UDPS, an argument 
for which there is some support.229 
 The UDPS under Etienne Tshisekedi was formed out of the “Parliament” and 
single party (Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution) of Mobutu’s dictatorship in the 
1970s and 1980s, first as a group of rebellious Mobutu insiders demanding democratic 
reform (the “group of thirteen”), and then officially as the UDPS on 15th February 
1982,230 as an opposition organization to Mobutu’s rule which consistently lobbied for 
democratic reform with popular backing.231  A subsequent but ultimately aborted gesture 
toward democratic reforms was undertaken by the Mobutu regime in the 1990s, first in 
the form of “popular consultations” on the party-state system from January 1990, then 
from the 24th April 1990 announcement that he would abandon the single-party system, 
from whence a “transitional parliament” (the Conférence Nationale Souveraine) was 
formed on 7th August 1991.  This transitional parliament was comprised of opposition 
and ruling politicians, and was for short times under the Premiership of Tshisekedi as 
elected by the transitional legislative body and appointed by Mobutu on 30th September 
to October 1991 (appointed), 15th August to December 1992 (elected), and from 3rd 
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December 1997 (appointed) until the AFDL coup under Laurent Kabila.232  The initial 
moves taken by the Mobutu regime toward the formation of this transitional legislature 
and the holding of democratic elections, however, were shortly thereafter discarded and 
subverted.  Some of the interesting and pertinent ways in which Mobutu subverted his 
own acquiescence to democratisation included generating artificial opposition parties 
allied with the regime,233 by which a pro-Mobutu Mouvance Présidentielle alliance was 
formed in the CNS (as against the opposition Union Sacrée alliance),234 and subverting 
the authority of the transitional parliament by simply recalling his own parliament and 
appointing a rival government.235  The two legislative bodies were eventually 
consolidated into a 700+ member Haut Conseil de la République -Parlement de 
Transition, which Mobutu was able to dominate with loyal men.236  After reneging on his 
commitments to democracy, and the failure of the institutions he constructed for that 
purpose to make any progress toward democratisation, Mobutu became embroiled in the 
rebellion that would remove him from power from October 1996.   
During this time the UDPS and Etienne Tshisekedi were again brought into 
power, and vocally came down on the side of integrating the rebels in the hopes they 
would bring democracy, and thereby the UDPS to power, although this suggestion was 
rejected both by Mobutu as well as by L.D. Kabila.237   
Contrary to Tshisekedi’s expectations, however, upon entering the capital 
welcomed by the UDPS and their supporters, the rebel AFDL installed Laurent Kabila as 
dictator and marginalized the position of the political opposition.  Laurent Kabila 
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attempted to institutionalize a system very much like those envisioned both by Mobutu 
and Museveni, one without political parties, possessed of “grassroots” “democratic” 
structure (the Comités de Pouvoir Populaire), et cetera, but this was rejected by both 
Congolese and new rebels alike, and L.D. Kabila for reasons unknown in their specificity 
was assassinated by one of his own famous kadogo child soldiers.238  At the conclusion 
of the second rebellion and the installation of a peace treaty dictated transitional 
government headed by the son of Laurent Kabila, Joseph Kabila, the UDPS and the 
political opposition was again marginalized at the expense of militant organizations that 
had to be included in government as a price of peace, and the UDPS refused to join the 
transitional government.239  Tshisekedi, who felt that as the elected leader of the original 
transitional parliament in the 1990s (though neither elected by the citizenry nor the only 
transitional leader) he was entitled to lead the nation, ultimately demanded his party and 
its supporters boycott the first democratic elections, as well as the constitutional 
referendum and voter registration.240  Tshisekedi’s attempts however were much less 
successful than anticipated, and his ultimate decision to boycott the 2006 elections, after 
initially changing his mind, rested on the fact that the citizens who would certainly vote 
for him had obeyed his call to boycott voter registration.241   
 There has been much debate surrounding Tshisekedi’s boycott of the 2006 
elections in the DRC, the most pessimistic positing that he did not want to risk submitting 
the UDPS, which had maintained the appearance of popularity, to an electoral 
competition that might shatter that illusion.  The most optimistic position, of course, is 
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that Tshisekedi could not see the value of submitting his organization to what he believed 
would be an unfair electoral process that would marginalize his organization with the 
appearance of legitimacy;242 and the most pragmatic would be belief in the offered 
justification that boycott was an attempt to negotiate the late registration of voters.243  
Regardless of his considerations in 2006, boycotting did not prevent the UDPS from 
suffering targeted attacks;244 and Tshisekedi did not boycott the 2011 elections, although 
he has challenged the results.  The outcome of these elections suggests that the UDPS 
will take the place of the MLC as the prominent opposition party in a position 
comfortably behind the incumbent. 
 Although it is evidently not as privileged as the MLC, the UDPS is possessed of 
several qualities that may strengthen its position vis-à-vis other opposition parties, 
namely: historical democratic legitimacy; popular oppositionism; and inherited structure.  
Working significantly against the UDPS is that, despite its historical role as an advocate 
for democracy it has never, even on the occasions when its leader has been Prime 
Minister of Zaire, had to expose itself to multiparty democratic competition.  The UDPS, 
in addition, is divided and relatively deprived of the resources required for a campaign,245 
and is considered to be embodied in the person of its leader and not in the substance of its 
political ideology.246 
 The UDPS, due to both its age as well as its long advocacy for democracy, is a 
high profile political organization committed to democratic reform in the DRC.  
Beginning in the Mobutu years and continuing through to today, the UDPS has agitated 
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for democracy, and has done so through two dictatorships and one multiparty regime and, 
as such, Tshisekedi and his organization possess a popular legitimacy.  Even as an 
organization that has failed to realize its goals through the past several decades of its 
existence, the UDPS has retained its position as a popular voice of opposition to 
incumbent governments in the DRC, and Tshisekedi and his organization have acquired 
the cult status commonly accorded brave opposition leaders and organizations in 
undemocratic regimes.  Although some may call Tshisekedi’s true intentions into 
question, he is without doubt a hero of democratic ideals to his supporters. 
 Finally, although it is unclear how directly this can translate into the present day 
given the post-conflict marginalization of the democratic opposition and the UDPS 
boycott of the 2006 elections, it is clear that the UDPS was able to initially benefit from 
being comprised of professional and elected politicians carved out of the Mobutu 
regime.247 
 In the 2006 elections Kabila won in the constitutionally provided second round 
run-off against Bemba of the MLC 58 per cent to 42 per cent.248  The first round figures 
were around 45 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.249  While many have pointed out 
the democratic effects of institutions such as constitutionally mandated second round 
presidential runoffs, particularly in the context of democratic breakdowns, it is of note 
that the third most popular candidate in the first round, Antoine Gizenga of the Parti 
Lumumbiste Unifié, threw his support behind Kabila in the second round in exchange for 
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the office of the Prime Minister,250 although he later resigned (on 25th September 2008) 
to be replaced by his PALU deputy Adolphe Muzito after Kabila himself began to sit in 
meetings of Council of Ministers in the Prime Minister’s stead.251   
DRC 2006 Elections Summary 
   PARTY: 
 
SEATS: 
   
      AMP 
 
298 
   UN 
 
116 
   
      Total 
Opposition 202 
   
      Total seats in legislature 
  
500 
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party 57.43 
 
Two hundred and sixty seven political parties were registered in the DRC leading 
up to the 2006 elections, and 70 of those won at least one seat in the National Assembly, 
whilst independent candidates won approximately 20 per cent of seats.252  While no party 
holds a majority in the 500 seat National Assembly, Kabila was able to form a legislative 
alliance comprised of 298 legislators,253 centered around the 111 seats held by his 
party,254 which was able to immediately exclude the opposition from important positions 
and committees.255  By way of contrast, the MLC won 64 seats.256  This alliance has 
continued to the present first under the name of the Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle 
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(AMP), and from 18th March 2011 simply the Majorité Présidentielle (MP).257  However 
it has not gone unchallenged by the opposition, which formed under Bemba’s MLC as 
the Union pour la Nation holding a majority in five provincial assemblies258 (while 
Kabila was able to take eight259), and 116 seats in the National Assembly.260  This seat 
proportion meant that Union pour la Nation was able to monopolize 57.43 per cent of the 
political opposition from the 2006 mandate.  Of note, however, is that in the run up to the 
2011 elections the MP became more exclusively structured around the President’s PPRD 
party and excluded parties with less than five representatives in the National Assembly, 
with the effect of encouraging the smaller parties to simply incorporate into the PPRD 
directly and thereby reinforce its dominance.261 
Weiss has observed that voting patterns in the 2006 elections appear to reflect a 
rejection of de facto leaders during the war, Kabila taking the East where the rebel 
factions ruled, and Bemba taking the West where Kabila’s government was able to retain 
power.262  This rejection is also expressed by the fact that only 45 of the 500 members of 
the Transitional National Assembly were democratically returned.263  This pattern, 
however, also mirrors the division of major lingua franca in DRC, Kabila winning the 
Swahili speaking regions, and Bemba in Lingala speaking regions and,264 indeed, it has 
been noted that both Kabila and Bemba attempted to mobilize voters on regional and 
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ethnic lines.265  Finally, it has been suggested that Kabila carried the East in 2006 based 
on the hopes of Eastern Congolese that the President would restore peace to the region,266 
the fulfillment of which task is a matter of controversy portending some suspicion 
regarding his ability to carry the same vote in 2011.267 
The incumbent response to opposition has, on the whole, been repressive and 
manipulative.  At an institutional level Joseph Kabila, now the electorally mandated 
president, has sought to extend electoral mandates from five to seven years, to remove 
term limits, to give the office of the president constitutional power over the judiciary, to 
prevent the decentralization of executive power (a question of significant historical 
salience in DRC, and a provision guaranteed by the terms of peace), to abolish the 
parliamentary office of the prime minister, and to extend presidential powers, despite the 
fact that the democratically ratified constitution of the DRC expressly forbids many of 
these undertakings.268  In parliament the incumbent has purportedly engaged in the 
intimidation of members and the withholding of members salaries, which pay when 
actually received is low enough to generate a susceptibility to corruption as it stands.269  
Additionally, an informal institutional structure has arisen around the office of the 
president which is comprised of parallel networks of decision making that exert control 
over government, the legislature and the judiciary.270  In particular, the prerogatives of 
the office of the Prime Minister have been effectively stripped, and unelected advisors 
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attached to the President impose decisions on democratically elected Ministers.271  Vital 
Kamerhe, a member of the president’s party appointed as Speaker of the National 
Assembly, attempted to use that office in order to affect democratic criticism of 
government policy only to be pushed out of office and replaced by 2009.272  Furthermore, 
Kabila has exerted personal control over the Republican Guard and civilian and military 
intelligence agencies, and has allegedly exerted informal control over additional agencies 
through networks of personal friends.273  One of the institutions in which this tendency 
has apparently culminated is in the construction of a “secret commission” comprised of 
agents from multiple agencies based on their loyalty to the president, and which allegedly 
has arrested in excess of 200 persons primarily from amongst civilians, journalists, police 
and soldiers believed to support Bemba, only one of which arrest has actually been 
brought to trial.274  Such practices are thought to be spread much wider than in this 
commission alone.275  A final point worth noting is that local elections in the DRC have 
not taken place,276 although they are reported to be scheduled for some point in 2013.277 
Direct actions against Bemba and the MLC have included intimidation of 
Bemba’s father; the discharging of weapons at a hospital owned by Bemba; looting of the 
MLC office in Kinshasa; material confiscation, arrests and threats made against 
journalists working for news agencies owned by Bemba, the looting of, and government 
bans against those agencies; and the sacking of an MLC provincial governor’s house, 
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amongst other activities.278   
Analysing repression of the opposition in the context of the 2006 elections, 
however,  is difficult in the context of the major candidates having recently emerged from 
a state of war in which they were adversaries and in which opposition leaders, in 
particular Bemba, retained significant security forces.  The government openly claimed 
that suppression of Bemba was integral in that he planned a coup prior to the second 
round run-off, and Bemba’s material ability to resist such repression resulted in open 
combat in Kinshasa.279  This sort of conflict continued after the elections, and erupted 
more than once in 2007 when Bemba continued to refuse to place his personal guard, 
comprised of somewhere between 400 and 800 men, under central authority (personal 
bodyguard is limited to 108), allegedly resulting in hundreds of deaths.280  One is left to 
question however, if Bemba intended to commit to the democratic process, was his 
ability to outfit a military force capable of resisting government violence a good for 
democracy?  Certainly Bemba and the MLC appeared to more or less commit to the 
democratic process and the role of the opposition after the elections.  But, of course, one 
cannot know the true intentions of persons in such situations and whether or not those 
intentions will be for good when one has possession of the power to do good or evil as 
one pleases, and Bemba is, furthermore, presently accused of war crimes in relation to 
MLC activities in the Central African Republic.281 
Leading up to the 2011 elections the opposition was characterized by a decline in 
the relevance of the MLC, the return to electoral politics of the UDPS under Etienne 
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Tshisekedi, and a regrouping of opposition alliances.282  The extant Union pour la Nation 
coalition was reformed into the Union Sacrée pour l’Alternance, a grouping of small 
parties with little political weight, and the Dynamique Tshisekedi Président, the coalition 
backing Etienne Tshisekedi.283  The problems that lie herein range from the obvious, that 
the opposition becomes hereby even more divided, to the speculative, that these two 
coalitions are competing for the same seats already held by the opposition.284  
Nevertheless, Etienne Tshisekedi declared himself the natural leader of the opposition 
and indicated that all parties should unite behind him,285 although the MLC in particular 
has refused to do so (still controlled by Bemba from the Hague, who expelled in-country 
leader and UDPS defector Muamba from the party in April 2011).286  In general, the 
opposition parties formed from belligerents following the peace appear to be in danger of 
losing their position to the non-belligerent political parties,287 and as it stands, the MLC 
was the only such party to make a significant electoral showing. 
DRC 2011 Elections Summary 
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Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party 49.33 
 
In the 2011 elections Kabila won in the now exclusive first round of presidential 
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elections with 48.95 per cent of the vote, whilst Tshisekedi took 32.33 per cent.  The next 
most popular candidate was Vital Kamerhe, now of the Union pour la Nation Congolaise 
with 7.74 per cent, and all other candidates garnered less votes than this.  In the 
legislative portion of the elections, the President’s PPRD party directly secured 62 seats, 
the UDPS 41 seats, whilst other major showings were the People for Peace and 
Democracy Party (anglicized, PPPD) with 29 seats, the Mouvement Social pour le 
Renouveau (MSR) with 27 seats, PALU with 19, the UNC with 17, independent 
candidates holding 16 and the MLC dropping to 22 seats, and all other parties showing 
equal to or less than 16 seats.288  Significantly, the UDPS was able to field 386 
candidates, whereas the PPRD fielded 494, PALU 476, MSR 465, UNC 447 and PPPD 
394.289  It has been reported that Kabila’s Majorité Présidentielle coalition now holds 
only 260 seats, significantly down although still an absolute majority, whilst the 
opposition coalition holds 110 seats, leaving 113 unaligned, and 17 vacant.290  Regarding 
the parties with major showings, PALU, as noted above, threw their support behind 
Kabila in 2006, whilst the PPPD and MSR are considered to be closely related to Kabila, 
and are part of his legislative alliance.291  While some may view the drop in incumbent 
alliance seats as a gain for the opposition, it now only monopolizes 49.33 per cent of the 
non-incumbent vote, which is in effect a decline of almost 10 per cent from 2006. 
In the months leading up to the 2011 elections incumbent activities were 
characterized by threats and physical attacks against members of the opposition, with UN 
investigators documenting 188 cases of politically motivated human rights violations 
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prior to the commencement of official campaigns.292  These violations have included 
restrictions on political activities, the use of unnecessary force against demonstrators, and 
the arbitrary arrests of opposition party members, their supporters and journalists.293  On 
6th October a UDPS rally in Kinshasa was broken up with tear gas and the firing of live 
rounds, leaving one person dead and ten wounded,294 whilst some pro-government 
candidates have openly encouraged their supporters to use violence against the 
opposition.295  Approaching its exposure to a second electoral contest the incumbent 
altered the electoral system so that presidential elections were conducted with a single 
poll, removing the second round run off,296 has sought to replace proportional 
representation with a majority voting list system,297 and replaced the inclusive 21 
member Commission Electorale Indépendante with a seven member Commission 
Electorale Nationale Indépendante, comprised of four majority and three opposition 
representatives.298  Furthermore, in the case of cash shortfall for elections from traditional 
donors to the DRC, the new electoral commission approached both Russia and Iran for 
support.299 
The Case of Rwanda 
 Rwanda gained independence from Belgium after a period of time as a 
protectorate inherited from the old German colonies in 1962.  At that time, given the rigid 
identity based institutionalization of a questionably historic Hutu-Tutsi social cleavage, it 
was seen as propitious that postcolonial “democracy” should be characterized, in 
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Rwanda, as reflecting the right of the majority “Hutu” to govern.  Although “Hutu 
power” was neither reflective of other states with a similar identity structure (e.g. in 
Burundi), nor was the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage reflective of states with significant 
Banyarwanda populations (e.g. DRC), the expression of “democratic” rule in 
independent Rwanda was more or less expressed as one-party rule by a Hutu nationalist 
party until the 1990s.300  As is well known, the “Hutu” dominated government was 
challenged from 1990 by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (hereinafter RPF) which led to the 
invasion, from Uganda, of an army of ex-patriot “Tutsi” and other Rwandan exiles, many 
of whom had participated in the NRM/A rebellion about a decade earlier.  Although this 
conflict led to a brokered peace in 1993 (Arusha Peace Accords) which would guarantee 
the political rights of Tutsi in a government of national unity, the results were the 
genocide of 1994 followed by the ultimate victory of the RPF and their assumption of 
power in Kigali. 
 The RPF government, since 1994, has pursued a policy of democratization, as far 
as their administration concerns this thesis.  This democratization commenced in 1999 
with the organization of local elections, and culminated in national presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2003,301 following a four year extension of the “transition” 
period.302 
 The party system in Rwanda, not unlike in Uganda, has been comprised of several 
small historic non-incumbent parties which have won insignificant fractions of the vote 
since being co-opted into government during the Transitional National Assembly, and 
which have been significantly repressed by the incumbent government.  The three extant 
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historic political parties were the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain,303 the Parti 
Social Démocrate, and the Parti Libéral.304  Repression of the MDR, PSD and PL has 
consisted of the harassment, arrest, and possibly the assassination of members who speak 
out against the government line.305   Unlike the pattern of events in Uganda, however, 
there has been no successful formation of a new and strong opposition party capable of 
garnering a significant proportion of absolute votes or meaningfully monopolizing the 
vote share of the opposition, and two of the historic political parties have retained their 
close association with the incumbent beyond the transitional years.   
The failure for a new democratic party to take form could, quite possibly, be the 
result of “elite learning”306 as Pasteur Bizimungu, a (possibly nominal)307 president in the 
early years of the regime, resigned 23rd March 2000,308 and replaced as president by 
Kagame in April 2000,309 attempted to form a new party in 2001310 which was 
immediately suppressed by the regime (the Parti pour la Démocratie et le Renouveau – 
Ubuyanja).311  This suppression consisted of arrest, harassment, physical attacks, 
disappearances and murder.312  Bizimungu was sentenced to 15 years in prison for 
embezzling and inciting violence in June 2004, but granted a presidential pardon in April 
2007.313  The MDR, led by 1994-1995 Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, who 
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resigned and went into exile August 1995,314 was considered by the regime as the most 
threatening extant opposition party due to its broad support by the “Hutu” majority (thus 
creating a fear of “Burundi Syndrome”) and was similarly suppressed leading up to the 
2003 elections, which suppression included the arrest of prominent members on the 
grounds of promoting “divisionism”315 and “genocide ideology,” the naming of members 
of the party associated with these charges, and a parliamentary motion to officially ban 
the party on 15 April 2003, endorsed by government on 16 May 2003,316 forced 
Twagiramungu, who was contesting the presidency, to run as an independent;317 albeit, 
Twagiramungu’s position was far better than Bizimungu’s.  
This pattern of suppression continued through the 2010 elections, where attempts 
at the formation of several new parties have been stymied.  The leader of the Forces 
Démocratiques Unifiées – Inkingi, Victoire Ingabire, was threatened, attacked and 
arrested on charges of genocide ideology, divisionism, creating an armed group, 
complicity in terrorist attacks, complicity in endangering the state through terrorism and 
armed violence, inciting the public to rise up against the state, and collaboration with the 
FDLR.  An attempt by incumbent RPF members to break away and form a Rwandan 
branch of the Green Party (the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda) resulted in 
harassment, intimidation, and the assassination of the party’s vice-president.318 
The Democratic Green Party has been unable to officially register due to its 
inability to procure the necessary signed documents.  In order to do so it must convene a 
party congress, which it has attempted to do on several occasions, once being disrupted 
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by persons shouting RPF slogans, and later being denied permission to hold a rally based 
on its lack of required police clearance, which clearance the police refused to provide.  Its 
attempts to seek the aid of the government on the matter have been ignored.319  The 
leader of the party has refused to contest the presidential elections as an independent.320   
Victoire Ingabire of the FDU Inkingi has been arrested on charges of association 
with a terrorist group, propagating genocide ideology, revisionism, and divisionism,321 
and is being tried alongside four members of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du 
Rwanda who have all incriminated her,322 while the party has been unable to officially 
register or field a presidential candidate in the latest elections.323   
Another new party, the Parti Social-Imberakuri, was registered in July 2009 but 
allegedly taken over by pro-RPF dissident members by March of 2010, their leader 
arrested in June 2010, and sentenced to four years in prison as of February 2011 on 
convictions of endangering national security, divisionism, and attempting to organize 
demonstrations without authorization.324  Several members of this same party were 
arrested in June of 2010 for attempting to hold a demonstration.325 
This suppression, combined with a 5% vote share cut-off for representation in 
parliament and government party funding,326 has meant that only three parties other than 
the incumbent RPF, of a total of ten registered parties,327 have effectively been able to 
contest: Parti Libéral, Parti Social Démocrate, and the Party of Peace and Concord, 
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whilst only the RPF, PL and PSD are represented in the Chamber of Deputies.328  It 
should be noted in addition that those parties which do not meet the cut-off for 
government funding may technically receive funding from the Forum of Political Parties, 
that there is no limit to campaign expenditure, nor requirements to make sources of 
funding public.329  Of these parties, the PSD and PL form part of the government in a 
power sharing agreement, whilst the latter, PPC, although not privy to this power sharing 
agreement, has no representation in the Chamber of Deputies and is led by a Senator, Dr 
Mukabaramba, who owes this position to her premature withdrawal from the 2003 
presidential elections in order to back RPF candidate Kagame.330  This being said, the 
close association of these parties to the incumbent has not prevented the RPF from 
significantly interfering in their politics,331 and it has been suggested that the mechanism 
through which these parties have become effectively co-opted by the RPF has been the 
total incumbent control of appointments without consultation with its coalition parties.332 
 RPF control of the party system has culminated in the creation of the Forum of 
Political Parties, or the Consultative Forum of Political Organizations in Rwanda,333 at 
first an informal organization later constitutionally mandated in 2003, which must 
approve all members of parliament put forward by parties, and is undoubtedly dominated 
by the incumbent RPF.334  This institution has effectively provided a venue in which the 
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RPF can remove legislators it dislikes from parliament, and has allegedly been supported 
by other parties as a venue by which party discipline can be enforced.335  It has been 
suggested that the congruent timing of this institutional innovation with the ending of the 
transitional government was not coincidental.336  A second institutional mechanism has 
been erected by the RPF over eligibility for the franchise, which excludes refugees, 
prisoners, persons convicted of murder, rape, genocide or crimes against humanity, and 
importantly, persons “lacking integrity.”  In Rwandan law a person of integrity is one 
who has not been convicted of genocide, genocide ideology, discrimination, divisionism 
or corruption.337  Thirdly, at the confluence of the franchise and party regulation, 
presidential candidates must be possessed of “irreproachable morals and probity,” 
amongst other more typical criteria.338 
 In the background of this repression of a viable opposition is the manipulation of 
civil society organizations, limitations on the freedom of speech and significant 
interference in the press,339 in particular where regime policies are criticized or 
challenged.340  Media is overseen by the institution of the Media High Council and, 
regardless, is dominated by the state-owned Rwanda Bureau of Information and 
Broadcasting.341  In the 2010 presidential elections in particular the Media High Council 
suspended two independent newspapers for the duration of the campaign.342  That being 
said, there are regulations regarding the equitable and free access to political content 
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during campaign periods,343 how useful that is in the context of the exclusion of all 
parties truly in opposition is debatable. 
Rwanda 2003 Elections Summary 
  PARTY: 
 
SEATS: 
   
      RPF 
 
40 
   PSD 
 
7 
   PL 
 
6 
   
      Total Opposition 13 
   
      Total seats in legislature 
  
80 
Total seats elected by universal franchise 53 
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party 53.85 
    
 The overall outcomes of electoral competition in Rwanda has consisted of 
Kagame officially winning over 95 per cent of the popular vote in 2003, in which his 
RPF party won 73.8 per cent of the vote, filling 40 of 53 directly elected seats in an 80 
seat lower house (while the upper house is not elected).344  The opposition was fairly 
evenly divided between the PSD (12 per cent) and the PL (10 per cent), although both 
parties supported Kagame’s presidential candidacy and comprise an alliance with the 
RPF.345  So whilst the PSD technically commanded a 53.85 per cent monopolization of 
the opposition following 2003, the value of such a number is highly suspect.   
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Rwanda 2008 Elections Summary 
  PARTY: 
 
SEATS: 
   
      RPF 
 
42 
   PSD 
 
7 
   PL 
 
4 
   
      Total Opposition 11 
   
      Total seats in legislature 
  
80 
Total seats elected by universal franchise 53 
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party 63.66 
 
In the 2008 elections the RPF garnered 78.8 per cent of the vote, winning 42 
seats, the PSD taking 7 and the PL  4.346  This represented an absolute loss for the PSD, 
but a roughly 10 per cent monopolization gain insofar as their command of non-RPF 
seats rose to 63.66 per cent.  Consistent with some suspicions of the nature of vote 
rigging in electoral authoritarian regimes, it has been suggested that the regime 
manipulated this number down to the benefit of the opposition in order to appear more 
democratic.347   
In the 2010 presidential elections Kagame again won with 93.08 per cent of the 
vote in a competition lacking a meaningful challenger,348 and one in which none of the 
new opposition parties were allowed to contest.349  The PSD candidate won 5.15%, PL 
1.37% and PPC 0.4%.350  The campaign was observed to be significantly dominated by 
the incumbent,351 albeit peaceful and none of the parties actually permitted to contest 
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reported being interfered with.352 
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Chapter 7: Case Analysis 
In Chapter 7 the raw data from the case presentation above will be analysed in 
regard to the relationships between the generation of strong opposition parties in hybrid 
regimes and the critical issues expounded above, namely: party financing; structural 
inheritance; the presence or absence of violence in the party system; party 
fractionalization and the proliferation of independent members; and the presence or 
absence of identity, and in particular ethnic based parties in the party system.  These 
critical issues will be given separate and methodical treatment below. 
Party Financing 
 Although it is not possible to unearth the minutia of party financing in the Great 
Lakes region of Africa from secondary sources, it may be soundly inferred from the cases 
above that the ability or inability of parties to finance themselves matters a great deal.  It 
is clear in those cases that the presence of domestic or international funding can make the 
difference between success and failure between parties which are otherwise similar in 
structural capacity, as well as in the constraints they face from the incumbent and the 
party system. 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo the well financed MLC out-performed all 
other non-incumbent political parties in 2006, both those inheriting similar rebel 
organizational structure and participating in transitional government, and well as 
traditional political parties.  The MLC performance in 2006 was also significantly 
stronger than that of the UDPS in 2011.  Similarly in Uganda where there is a strong 
opposition party there is also a comparatively flourishing and autonomous business class, 
and a number of international donors that set aside funds for political parties.   
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Although these inferences are indirect, their credibility is certainly enhanced by 
the inability of opposition parties in Rwanda, legal or not, to gain any sort of national 
voice or make an absolute electoral impact where foreign funding is banned, and access 
to state funding is tightly regulated in blatant favour of the incumbent. 
Structural Inheritance  
 There is a demonstrable pattern in the states considered herein of the effective 
marginalization of longstanding historic parties at the expense of comparatively effective 
but young political parties.  In this context it is may be contended that the structural 
inheritance theory should be expanded to include the advantages afforded political parties 
formed out of standing legislatures.  Regarding the competitive notion of elite defection, 
the defection of a Besigye or a Tshisekedi, whilst important and certainly exerting a pull 
on other politicians, cannot logically be the exclusive font of a party’s competitiveness, 
particularly in the style of riding found throughout the Commonwealth.  This thesis 
therefore contends that what makes these new parties competitive are the structural 
advantages imbued by the professional politicians who have been “pulled.”  The 
politicians who enter the party in parliament with an expertise in legislative politics; with 
established constituencies; (hopefully) with campaign experience and sources of funding, 
but certainly with the knowledge of how to acquire and retain their positions, as well as 
the experience of doing so; bring with them thereby a definitive advantage not possessed 
by new parties and not adequately explained by the elite status of party leaders.353 
Secondly, as was demonstrated by the MLC in DRC, as well as by the incumbent 
regimes in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda collectively, translating an armed organization into 
a political one carries similar structural advantages.  Although this thesis is not concerned 
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to treat the long history of military coups in world politics herein, nor the extensive 
scholarship on that subject, military organizations possess strengths directly transferrable 
to mass politics. 
In Uganda structural inheritance may explain the differential success of the FDC, 
formed by serving politicians in the no-party legislature, over historic political parties 
such as the UPC or DP which, while having some members who served in Movement 
politics, were divided as to who was and was not willing to acquiesce to the Movement 
and the status of those who did.  The FDC, by contrast, was able to enter politics as a fait 
accompli body of professional politicians, and one familiar with how NRM Uganda 
functions. 
In the DRC the MLC certainly benefited from the facts that it was a cohesive 
military organization with defined organizational structure, as well as a participant in 
government during the transitional years.  The MLC also, however, offers a good 
indication of the limits of the traction of structural inheritance, insofar as there were other 
significant rebel groups who participated in the transitional government and failed to 
make a meaningful electoral showing.  However, the UDPS may bear the opposite 
implication, being as it was an organization formed out of a one-party state like the FDC, 
but so formed nearly thirty years prior to exposing itself to electoral competition, and 
carved out of an extinct regime.  Finally, the UNC under Vital Kamerhe, which contested 
the 2011 election after Kamerhe was removed from the president’s party, indicates yet 
another qualification of this theory.  It may either be the case that structural inheritance is 
subject to the law of diminishing returns regarding the number of actors and parties that 
break away from association with the incumbent, or that Kamerhe and the UNC trace the 
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distinction between structural inheritance and the so-called “elite recycling” 
phenomenon.354  The contradictory evidence found in the DRC would suggest that 
structural inheritance is likely a latent variable which requires some other input in order 
to affect outcomes, as the performance of both the UDPS and the UNC would suggest 
that the age or novelty of a party’s structure is irrelevant, while the fact that only the 
MLC garnered a meaningful electoral showing after the transitional government suggests 
that the mere presence of that organizational structure is not sufficient. 
Evidence from Rwanda indicates that, while not sufficient, such structural 
inheritance may be necessary for strong opposition parties, and therefore democratic 
outcomes, in hybrid regimes.  This may be deduced from the facts that there is no strong 
and autonomous opposition party in Rwanda capable of monopolizing opposition votes, 
where both existing political parties (such as the MDR) and attempts at the formation of 
new parties carved out of the regime (such as the DGPR) have been directly suppressed.  
Both the Parti Libéral and the Parti Social Démocrate have shown themselves incapable 
thus far of acting autonomously from the RPF, and in light of the showing of such parties 
as the MDR, PL and PSD; the UPC and DP in Uganda; or PALU in DRC; one might be 
skeptical of the true value of the collaboration of historic political parties with coup 
governments.  In fact, the only “historic” political party to make a strong showing has 
been the UDPS in DRC, and this party ultimately refused cooperation with coup 
governments.  It is of note, however, that this rejection was not indicative of its 
willingness to cooperate should such governments have offered the UDPS a position it 
                                                          
354 I have not given the theory of “elite recycling” independent consideration in this analysis because I am 
not convinced of its unique traction in Africa, where is has been heavily studied, as opposed to in every 
known democracy around the world where “elite recycling” is not studied as such, but is simply observed 
as “politics.” 
 106 
felt it deserved. 
Violence in the Party System 
 Contrary to the expectations of this thesis, it does appear to be the case that 
violence in the party system affects the performance of opposition parties, at least 
according to the investigative criteria herein.  Of course, violence may certainly act on 
the absolute strength of the opposition, and its effect may be non-linear, as is indicated by 
many studies on opposition mobilization at the end of authoritarian regimes.  But it may 
be the case that the most important violence is not that which takes place in party systems 
against candidates and party leaders, nor even executed acts of violence, but the 
intimidation which is brought to bear directly against individual voters.   
In Rwanda, for example, it has been noted that the practice of casting votes 
through thumb-printing, which calls the secret ballot into question,355 in confluence with 
a dismal record on human rights,356 may serve to significantly intimidate the electorate 
into supporting the regime.  In Uganda violence may be only a surreptitious possibility of 
not voting for the incumbent, for example through the open implication that only 
Museveni can control the armed forces and prevent them from (returning to) the practice 
of terrorizing the population.357  In the DRC, by contrast, open acts of violence appear 
almost endemic to politics, but both the MLC and the UDPS have been able to 
significantly monopolize the opposition through the construction of opposition legislative 
alliances. 
The Proliferation of Independent Candidates and Small Parties 
 As mentioned above, the proliferation of independent candidates and small parties 
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can have diverse effects on electoral outcomes, the most troubling of which, in hybrid 
regimes, is the perpetuation of incumbency.  This effect functions through the mechanism 
of independents and small parties, for various reasons, overtly associating themselves 
with the incumbent either prior to elections, or after winning seats.  The timing of this 
association is likely tightly related to the motivations for running.  However the presence 
of a large number of independent candidates and small parties does not appear to affect 
the capacity of a strong opposition party to form according to the criteria herein. 
 In the case of Rwanda, where there is a five per cent official status threshold,358 
the incumbent RPF allowed six minor parties entrance on a common list with the RPF 
who were otherwise unlikely to meet the threshold.359  This means that while the 
presence of independents and the number of parties is heavily restricted, this restriction 
heavily incentivizes those parties and persons to assimilate with the incumbent. 
 In Uganda independent candidates have consistently matched the electoral 
showing of the strongest opposition party.  As noted, these candidates are not ideological 
constituency independents, but are typically members of the NRM who have lost party 
primaries but still possess the means and desire to run, and typically tow the NRM line in 
parliament.  While this may complicate electoral politics for the NRM in those 
constituencies, it is probably not having a direct effect on the opposition.  The continued 
independence of the UPC and DP, however, and their refusal to join the IPC opposition 
coalition, probably does unnecessarily weaken the position of the opposition, although 
this is not typically what comes to mind when thinking of party system fragmentation and 
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the proliferation of small parties. 
 The party system in the DRC is highly fractionalized, as noted, with nearly 300 
registered parties and 70 with at least one seat in the assembly.  This fractionalization, 
however, has prevented neither the incumbent nor the opposition from forming strong 
legislative coalitions, which would appear to be the natural solution to such 
fragmentation.  That being said, the draw of coalition with the incumbent is obviously a 
more attractive option, and that fact clearly serves to perpetuate incumbency in a state 
where neither the PPRD nor the UDPS have a strong individual legislative presence.   
Institutional Factors 
 Several interesting institutional innovations have been expounded in the cases 
above which bear direct influence on opposition strength. 
 In Rwanda it has been noted that elections are largely regarded as free and fair, 
but the outcome of these electoral processes are manipulated a priori where the regime 
determines who can and cannot compete, and how those who can compete are allowed to 
campaign.360  This manipulation is institutionalized in the form of the RPF dominated 
Forum of Political Parties, with roots in earlier practices such as the no-party tickets and 
regulation of local government candidates.361  Not dissimilar from NRM rule in Uganda, 
the prohibition on political party affiliation in local contests neither meant that the 
incumbent RPF refrained from campaigning, nor from manipulating who could or could 
not run, or removing those who won from office.362  Manipulation of the campaigns of 
those who are not banned from contesting in Rwanda has included the confiscation of 
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party literature, and prohibitions on political rallies.363 
 In the 2003 elections the majority of candidates approved by the National 
Electoral Commission were from the RPF or affiliated with it,364 and as mentioned above 
former President Bizimungu was banned from contesting, whilst former Prime Minister 
Twagiramungu’s MDR party was suppressed, forcing him to run as an independent.  This 
manipulation continued into the 2010 elections wherein the Green Party (DGPR), as well 
as the FDU-Inkingi were both barred from contesting, and the latter’s leader arrested.365  
 There is a nascent organization of a similar nature in Uganda, the National 
Consultative Forum for Political Parties and Political Organizations.  However, this 
institution has never come into existence and is regarded more or less as something which 
would be a positive development.366  However there are de facto institutional 
impediments to free and fair elections in Uganda in the form of the ambiguity between 
electoral and criminal offences, the existence of an “incumbent” opposition, and the 
prolonged exclusion of all parties other than the NRM from government.  
In Uganda electoral crimes are technically compound, but are in practice litigated 
as flaws in the electoral process and rarely referred to criminal courts.367  This issue is 
further complicated by the fact that high ranking incumbent candidates are unlikely to be 
charged even under the less severe electoral laws, because all cases must be referred 
through the presidentially appointed director of public prosecutions, and similarly by the 
fact that there is a three month statute of limitations on electoral offenses.368  This has 
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had the effect of failing to deter criminal activity related to the electoral process.369 
The presence not only of a large number of NRM “independent” candidates, but 
also of a within government NRM “opposition” must serve, given the no-party political 
history of Uganda, as well as the apparent unlikelihood of the NRM being removed from 
power, of undermining the value of opposition parties to the electorate.  If oppositionism 
can be expressed by supporting pro-NRM independents or NRM dissidents who have not 
left the party, why should an elector vote for the FDC, UPC or DP who can deliver them 
nothing? 
Finally, the prolonged exclusion of all parties other than the NRM from 
incumbency may serve to make elections no more than an expensive public opinion poll.  
The NRM has shown itself not only as unbeatable thus far, but also as willing to take 
steps to remedy electoral unpopularity despite the fact that its removal from power is 
unlikely, exempli gratia its actions to win the northern vote in the latest elections.  This 
has obvious effects on the opposition, and in Uganda’s latest elections the opposition was 
notably weaker both in absolute terms, as well as according to the criteria of this analysis. 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, which neither benefits from the 
(presidentialised) Westminster system of Uganda, nor the strict regulation of the party 
system as in Rwanda, different institutional strategies have been adopted.  These 
primarily take the form of incumbent legislative coalitions, and the generation of 
incumbent allied political parties. 
The Alliance pour le Majorité Présidentielle in 2006, and Majorité Présidentielle 
later, have served as legislative venues by which the incumbent can construct and 
maintain an absolute assembly majority in the context of a highly fractionalized party 
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system.  Although the need for such alliances in a party system like that possessed by 
DRC is indisputable, the function of such alliances in a hybrid regime have ominous 
implications, namely that the draw of alliance with the incumbent is exponentially 
stronger than the draw to ally with the opposition.  As such, the determination of majority 
in the assembly probably hinges on the victor in presidential elections, where the 
incumbent has removed the second round, and does not appear to have a meaningful 
challenger. 
In addition, while the president is affiliated with the Parti du Peuple pour la 
Reconstruction et la Démocratie, he officially runs as an independent, and appears to be 
diversifying his legislative options and dominance by constructing incumbent alternates 
in the form of the PPPD and MSR parties.  This places parties closely allied with the 
person of the president first, third and fourth in absolute numbers of legislative seats, 
before one needs to even consider parties simply allied with Majorité Présidentielle such 
as the historic PALU which comes sixth. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 In conclusion, and given the evidence at hand, it can be contended that democratic 
outcomes in hybrid regimes are demonstrably contingent on the presence of strong 
opposition parties, as defined herein.  The presence or absence of strong opposition 
parties appear to hinge on the ability of these parties to fund themselves, and the latent 
structure they are or are not capable of co-opting and translating into political and 
electoral tools.  Other factors, such as violence in the party system and the proliferation 
of independent candidates, small parties and identity based parties, do not appear to 
directly affect the performance of those parties possessed of such funding and structural 
inheritance.  That being said, these parties remain vulnerable to targeted suppression by 
incumbents, most notably where the party system can be regulated to the exclusion of 
those parties which might challenge the incumbent, whilst maintaining the illusion of 
multi-party politics.  The best example of such an institution is in the form of Rwanda’s 
Forum of Political Parties.  Other institutions, though not as effective, appear to play a 
clear role in the preservation of incumbency, such as: broad incumbent coalitions and the 
generation of incumbent allied political parties, both of which notably dilute the value of 
electoral competition, and both of which have been notably utilized in the DRC under 
contemporary incumbent Joseph Kabila, as well as under the late rule of Mobutu before 
him; and the dilution of culpability for crimes committed during elections, of the value of 
an autonomous opposition when a shadow incumbent “opposition” exists, and long-term 
preclusion of all non-incumbent parties from electoral success through successive 
elections in which the incumbent can learn to win the support of dissenting electors, all of 
which are exemplified by NRM Uganda. 
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These findings are important because they suggest that the relationships widely 
reported in the literature between democratic outcomes and other structural and 
institutional variables appear to lose some explanatory power after minimal democratic 
reforms have been introduced.  Whilst it may be desirable to have a firm linear 
connection between structural variables that would easily incorporate democracy 
promotion into ongoing projects in the international community, or between clearly 
defined institutional arrangements and democratic outcomes, this research suggests that 
this may not be the case.  These simple relationships do exist, but they are neither linear, 
nor do they appear to retain the same explanatory power in hybrid regimes.  Once 
democratic reforms have been introduced, the strongest association with democratic 
outcomes appear to lie in strong democratic opposition parties capable of monopolizing 
the opposition vote and, in the context of hybrid regimes, the ability to monopolize that 
vote hinges on the ability to co-opt pre-existing organizational structures, to fund parties 
based around those structures, and the absence of effective institutional restraints on the 
party-system. 
Future research in this area could serve to delineate the intervening nature of the 
relationship between democratic outcomes and strong opposition parties with greater 
precision in relation to the broader structural and institutional variables in the literature.  
Secondly, more research into the measurement of opposition parties in hybrid regimes 
would certainly benefit the literature.  The measurement utilized herein, adopted from an 
operationalization in a recent qualitative study, has found a discrete relationship where 
logic has dictated its presence, but where prior quantitative research has been unable to 
expose it.  This measurement may be only an important step in the direction of 
 114 
determining how to disentangle some benefit from the flawed electoral practices and data 
that come out of hybrid regimes. 
In regard to policy implications, understanding the nature of democratic outcomes 
in hybrid regimes is important both because democratic governance is manifestly 
desirable for citizens around the world, as well as because many wealthy and democratic 
states have made the promotion of democracy an important aspect of their foreign 
policies.  In order to get the best returns for both interested parties, it is necessary to 
disentangle our understanding of democratic outcomes as casually linked to other 
normatively desirable projects being undertaken already, or as linked to simple 
institutional solutions.  Democratic outcomes, as the old democracies of the world know 
already through centuries or more of being on the trajectory toward democracy, are 
effectuated by the people they affect: by loyal oppositionists and by citizens both free to 
take up their role as electors without interference, as well as confident that taking up such 
a role is worthwhile in a given political system.  It is clear, in the context of this thesis, 
that the superior policy approach in regard to democratic outcomes specifically is in the 
support of democratic opposition party organizations, in particular in terms of funding, 
and in lobbying for the deconstruction of the institutional constraints in the party system 
which serve to weaken these organizations.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 33: Positive, Negative and Neutral Variation in Africa 1989-2010 in Presidential Systems 
  where an Opposition Party Monopolizes a Minimum of 25% of Opposition Seats 
   POSITIVE CHANGE 
 
NO CHANGE 
 
NEGATIVE CHANGE 
  Country Year Polity +10 Country Year Polity +10 Country Year Polity +10 
Angola1993 
 
Cameroon1993 6 Central African Republic1994 15 
 Angola1994 
 
Cameroon1994 6 Central African Republic1995 15 
 Angola1995 
 
Cameroon1995 6 Central African Republic1996 15 
 Angola1996 
 
Cameroon1996 6 Central African Republic1997 15 
 Angola1997 7 Cameroon1997 6 Central African Republic1998 15 
 Angola1998 7 Cameroon1998 6 Central African Republic1999 15 
 Angola1999 7 Cameroon1999 6 Central African Republic2000 15 
 Angola2000 7 Cameroon2000 6 Central African Republic2001 15 
 Angola2001 7 Cameroon2001 6 Central African Republic2002 15 
 Angola2002 8 Cameroon2002 6 Central African Republic2003 9 
 Angola2003 8 Cameroon2003 6 Central African Republic2006 9 
 Angola2004 8 Cameroon2004 6 Central African Republic2007 9 
 Angola2005 8 Cameroon2005 6 Central African Republic2008 9 
 Angola2006 8 Cameroon2006 6 Central African Republic2009 9 
 Angola2007 8 Cameroon2008 6 Central African Republic2010 9 
 Angola2008 8 Cameroon2009 6 Congo, Rep.1994 15 
 Angola2009 8 Cameroon2010 6 Congo, Rep.1995 15 
 Angola2010 8 Chad1998 8 Congo, Rep.1996 15 
 Benin1996 16 Chad1999 8 Congo, Rep.1997 4 
 Benin1997 16 Chad2000 8 Congo, Rep.2003 6 
 Benin1998 16 Chad2001 8 Congo, Rep.2004 6 
 Benin1999 16 Chad2002 8 Congo, Rep.2005 6 
 Benin2000 16 Chad2003 8 Congo, Rep.2006 6 
 Benin2001 16 Chad2004 8 Congo, Rep.2007 6 
 Benin2002 16 Chad2005 8 Congo, Rep.2008 6 
 Benin2003 16 Chad2006 8 Congo, Rep.2009 6 
 Benin2004 16 Chad2007 8 Congo, Rep.2010 6 
 Benin2005 16 Chad2008 8 Gambia, The1989 17 
 Benin2006 17 Chad2009 8 Gambia, The1990 18 
 Benin2007 17 Chad2010 8 Gambia, The1991 18 
 Benin2008 17 Congo, Dem. Rep2007 
 
Gambia, The1992 18 
 Benin2009 17 Congo, Dem. Rep2008 
 
Gambia, The1993 18 
 Benin2010 17 Congo, Dem. Rep2009 
 
Gambia, The1994 3 
 Burkina Faso1993 5 Congo, Dem. Rep2010 
 
Gambia, The1997 5 
 Burkina Faso1994 5 Equatorial Guinea1994 5 Gambia, The1998 5 
 Burkina Faso1995 5 Equatorial Guinea1995 5 Gambia, The1999 5 
 Burkina Faso1996 5 Equatorial Guinea1996 5 Gambia, The2000 5 
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Burkina Faso1997 6 Equatorial Guinea1997 5 Gambia, The2001 5 
 Burkina Faso1998 6 Equatorial Guinea1998 5 Gambia, The2002 5 
 Burkina Faso1999 6 Equatorial Guinea1999 5 Gambia, The2003 5 
 Burkina Faso2000 7 Equatorial Guinea2000 5 Gambia, The2004 5 
 Burkina Faso2001 10 Equatorial Guinea2001 5 Gambia, The2005 5 
 Burkina Faso2002 10 Equatorial Guinea2002 5 Gambia, The2006 5 
 Burkina Faso2003 10 Equatorial Guinea2003 5 Gambia, The2007 5 
 Burkina Faso2004 10 Equatorial Guinea2004 5 Gambia, The2008 5 
 Burkina Faso2005 10 Equatorial Guinea2005 5 Gambia, The2009 5 
 Burkina Faso2006 10 Equatorial Guinea2006 5 Gambia, The2010 5 
 Burkina Faso2007 10 Equatorial Guinea2007 5 Madagascar1990 4 
 Burkina Faso2008 10 Equatorial Guinea2008 5 Madagascar1991 
  Burkina Faso2009 10 Equatorial Guinea2009 5 Madagascar1992 19 
 Burkina Faso2010 10 Equatorial Guinea2010 5 Madagascar1993 19 
 Burundi1994 
 
Guinea1996 9 Madagascar1997 18 
 Burundi1995 
 
Guinea1997 9 Madagascar1998 17 
 Burundi1996 5 Guinea1998 9 Madagascar1999 17 
 Burundi1997 5 Guinea1999 9 Madagascar2000 17 
 Burundi1998 9 Guinea2000 9 Madagascar2001 17 
 Burundi1999 9 Guinea2001 9 Madagascar2002 17 
 Burundi2000 9 Guinea2002 9 Madagascar2003 17 
 Burundi2001 
 
Guinea2003 9 Madagascar2004 17 
 Burundi2002 
 
Guinea2004 9 Madagascar2005 17 
 Burundi2003 
 
Guinea2005 9 Madagascar2006 17 
 Burundi2004 
 
Guinea2006 9 Madagascar2007 17 
 Burundi2005 16 Guinea2007 9 Niger1994 18 
 Burundi2006 16 Guinea2008 9 Niger1995 18 
 Burundi2007 16 Malawi1995 16 Niger1996 4 
 Burundi2008 16 Malawi1996 16 Niger1997 4 
 Burundi2009 16 Malawi1997 16 Niger1998 4 
 Burundi2010 16 Malawi1998 16 Niger1999 15 
 Cape Verde1992 18 Malawi1999 16 Niger2000 15 
 Cape Verde1993 18 Malawi2000 16 Niger2001 15 
 Cape Verde1994 18 Malawi2001 14 Niger2002 15 
 Cape Verde1995 18 Malawi2002 14 Niger2003 15 
 Cape Verde1996 18 Malawi2003 15 Niger2004 16 
 Cape Verde1997 18 Malawi2004 16 Niger2005 16 
 Cape Verde1998 18 Malawi2005 16 Niger2006 16 
 Cape Verde1999 18 Malawi2006 16 Niger2007 16 
 Cape Verde2000 18 Malawi2007 16 Niger2008 16 
 Cape Verde2001 20 Malawi2008 16 Niger2009 7 
 Cape Verde2002 20 Malawi2009 16 Niger2010 13 
 Cape Verde2003 20 Malawi2010 16 Rwanda2004 7 
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Cape Verde2004 20 Mozambique1995 15 Rwanda2005 7 
 Cape Verde2005 20 Mozambique1996 15 Rwanda2006 7 
 Cape Verde2006 20 Mozambique1997 15 Rwanda2007 7 
 Cape Verde2007 20 Mozambique1998 15 Rwanda2008 7 
 Cape Verde2008 20 Mozambique1999 15 Rwanda2009 7 
 Cape Verde2009 20 Mozambique2000 15 Rwanda2010 6 
 Cape Verde2010 20 Mozambique2001 15 
   Comoros1994 14 Mozambique2002 15 
   Comoros1995 
 
Mozambique2003 15 
   Comoros1996 14 Mozambique2004 15 
   Comoros1997 14 Mozambique2005 15 
   Comoros1998 14 Mozambique2006 15 
   Comoros1999 8 Mozambique2007 15 
   Comoros2005 16 Mozambique2008 15 
   Comoros2006 19 Mozambique2009 15 
   Comoros2007 19 Mozambique2010 15 
   Comoros2008 19 Namibia1991 16 
   Comoros2009 19 Namibia1992 16 
   Comoros2010 19 Namibia1993 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1991 3 Namibia1994 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1992 3 Namibia1995 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1993 3 Namibia1996 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1994 4 Namibia1997 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1995 4 Namibia1998 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1996 4 Namibia1999 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1997 4 Namibia2000 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1998 4 Namibia2001 16 
   Cote d'Ivoire1999 
 
Namibia2002 16 
   Gabon1991 6 Namibia2003 16 
   Gabon1992 6 Namibia2004 16 
   Gabon1993 6 Namibia2005 16 
   Gabon1994 6 Namibia2006 16 
   Gabon1995 6 Namibia2007 16 
   Gabon1996 6 Namibia2008 16 
   Gabon2002 6 Namibia2009 16 
   Gabon2003 6 Namibia2010 16 
   Gabon2004 6 Nigeria2000 14 
   Gabon2005 6 Nigeria2001 14 
   Gabon2006 6 Nigeria2002 14 
   Gabon2007 6 Nigeria2003 14 
   Gabon2008 6 Nigeria2004 14 
   Gabon2009 13 Nigeria2005 14 
   Gabon2010 13 Nigeria2006 14 
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Ghana1997 12 Nigeria2007 14 
   Ghana1998 12 Nigeria2008 14 
   Ghana1999 12 Nigeria2009 14 
   Ghana2000 12 Nigeria2010 14 
   Ghana2001 16 Tanzania1996 9 
   Ghana2002 16 Tanzania1997 9 
   Ghana2003 16 Tanzania1998 9 
   Ghana2004 18 Tanzania1999 9 
   Ghana2005 18 Tanzania2000 9 
   Ghana2006 18 Tanzania2001 9 
   Ghana2007 18 Tanzania2002 9 
   Ghana2008 18 Tanzania2003 9 
   Ghana2009 18 Tanzania2004 9 
   Ghana2010 18 Tanzania2005 9 
   Guinea-Bissau1995 15 Tanzania2006 9 
   Guinea-Bissau1996 15 Tanzania2007 9 
   Guinea-Bissau1997 15 Tanzania2008 9 
   Guinea-Bissau1998 
 
Tanzania2009 9 
   Guinea-Bissau1999 
 
Tanzania2010 9 
   Guinea-Bissau2000 15 
     Guinea-Bissau2001 15 
     Guinea-Bissau2002 15 
     Guinea-Bissau2003 9 
     Guinea-Bissau2005 16 
     Guinea-Bissau2006 16 
     Guinea-Bissau2007 16 
     Guinea-Bissau2008 16 
     Guinea-Bissau2009 16 
     Guinea-Bissau2010 16 
     Kenya1993 5 
     Kenya1994 5 
     Kenya1995 5 
     Kenya1996 5 
     Kenya1997 8 
     Kenya1998 8 
     Kenya1999 8 
     Kenya2000 8 
     Kenya2001 8 
     Kenya2002 18 
     Kenya2003 18 
     Kenya2004 18 
     Kenya2005 18 
     Kenya2006 18 
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Kenya2007 17 
     Kenya2008 17 
     Kenya2009 17 
     Kenya2010 18 
     Liberia1989 4 
     Liberia1990 
      Liberia1998 10 
     Liberia1999 10 
     Liberia2000 10 
     Liberia2001 10 
     Liberia2002 10 
     Liberia2003 
      Liberia2006 16 
     Liberia2007 16 
     Liberia2008 16 
     Liberia2009 16 
     Liberia2010 16 
     Mali1998 16 
     Mali1999 16 
     Mali2000 16 
     Mali2001 16 
     Mali2002 17 
     Mali2003 17 
     Mali2004 17 
     Mali2005 17 
     Mali2006 17 
     Mali2007 17 
     Mali2008 17 
     Mali2009 17 
     Mali2010 17 
     Mauritania2002 4 
     Mauritania2003 4 
     Mauritania2004 4 
     Mauritania2005 5 
     Mauritania2007 14 
     Mauritania2008 5 
     Mauritania2009 8 
     Mauritania2010 8 
     Senegal1989 9 
     Senegal1990 9 
     Senegal1991 9 
     Senegal1992 9 
     Senegal1993 9 
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Senegal1994 9 
     Senegal1995 9 
     Senegal1996 9 
     Senegal1997 9 
     Senegal1998 9 
     Senegal1999 9 
     Senegal2000 18 
     Senegal2001 18 
     Senegal2002 18 
     Senegal2003 18 
     Senegal2004 18 
     Senegal2005 18 
     Senegal2006 18 
     Senegal2007 17 
     Sierra Leone1997 
      Sierra Leone1998 
      Sierra Leone1999 
      Sierra Leone2000 
      Sierra Leone2001 
      Sierra Leone2002 15 
     Sierra Leone2003 15 
     Sierra Leone2004 15 
     Sierra Leone2005 15 
     Sierra Leone2006 15 
     Sierra Leone2007 17 
     Sierra Leone2008 17 
     Sierra Leone2009 17 
     Sierra Leone2010 17 
     Uganda1995 6 
     Uganda1996 6 
     Uganda2007 9 
     Uganda2008 9 
     Uganda2009 9 
     Uganda2010 9 
     Zambia1992 16 
     Zambia1993 16 
     Zambia1994 16 
     Zambia1995 16 
     Zambia1996 11 
     Zambia1997 11 
     Zambia1998 11 
     Zambia1999 11 
     Zambia2000 11 
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Zambia2001 15 
     Zambia2002 15 
     Zambia2003 15 
     Zambia2004 15 
     Zambia2005 15 
     Zambia2006 15 
     Zambia2007 15 
     Zambia2008 17 
     Zambia2009 17 
     Zambia2010 17 
     
       * Polity scores are g enerated using the +10 method for all positive scores, transitional values are recoded as missing 
 ** Opposition monopolization is generated from the Database of Political Insitutions where the number of seats held 
 by the largest opposition party is divided by the total number of seats held by the opposition, and the quotient is  
 multiplied by 100 
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